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ABSTRACT
More than 40 initiatives to limit or reduce state and local taxes
have appeared on ballots across the country between 1978 and 1981.
Proposition 2-, an initiative to reduce property taxes by 40 percent,
was approved by almost three out .of five Massachusetts voters in
November 1980. One explanation for the occurrence of this "taxpayers
revolt" is that voters have become more conservative. The success of
Proposition 2#: and its counterparts in other states is often attributed
to voters' demands for lower taxes and fewer government services,
This thesis presents a case study of Proposition 21 in order to
examine the validity of this "conservative swing" explanation. The
thesis argues that to fully understand the meaning and significance of
Proposition 21, one must examine it in terms of its context. Ey
studying the nature of taxing and spending linits, the history of tax
reform in Massachusetts, and the sagas of the initiatives proponents
and opponents, it is clear that Massachusetts voters approved
Proposition 2- out of frustration with property taxes and an unrespon-
sive legislature, not because they wanted less local government. In
addition, the use of the initiative process to set tax policy reveals
a. weakness of single-issue voting: voters were only able to choose
between Proposition 2- and the status quo, not the myriad alternatives
between them. Finally, Proposition 2- illustrates how the divisiveness
of "cutback politics" hindered the attempts of opponents to propose
alternatives to the initiative.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert M. Fogelson
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
3CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
On November 4, 1980 Massachusetts voters approved by a threc-to-
two margin a law to reduce local property taxes by 40 percent. The
initiative, dubbed Proposition 2f, was expected to reduce property
taxes by $1.3 billion over the next five years. The day after the
election, the Boston Globe remarked that voters might have handed local
officials "the most severe fiscal crisis in the state's history."
Within days of the election, several cities and towns placed freezes on
hiring and cancelled special programs; others predicted how the property
tax cut would affect their budget. Cambridge City Manager James L.
Sullivan, for example, painted a bleak picture for his city's future.
"We will have to lay off one-third of our employees -- that's 250
teachers, 100 firemen, 100 policemen, 175 public works employees --
and we'll have to close down the health clinics, the branch libraries,
the community schools. And," he added, "that's just the first year."
By March of 1981, six months after the election and four months before
Proposition 2- would be effective, the potential impacts of the
initiative were glaringly clear. Moody's Investors Service announced
that it had temporarily suspended the credit ratings for 37 cities and
towns and 7 special districts; the cities and towns on Moody's list
included almost 45 percent of the state's 5.7 million residents. In
April, Boston's schools ran out of money and stayed open only when
ordered to by the courts. Mayor Kevin White, citing Proposition 2- as
the cause, closed seven neighborhood police stations and 13 firehouses.
His action touched off a series of sit-ins and demonstrations that
4attracted national attention. Throughout this period, state legislators
have been reluctant to repeal or alter the law until it is clear that
drastic cuts will be necessary. In the words of one legislator, "You
don't mess around too much with anything that has won by a 59 - 41
margin."'
Proposition 2 is a drastic measure. The average effective
property tax rate in Massachusetts was 4.7 percent in 1980; it will be
almost halved to 2.5 percent of full value under the new tax cut. At
the time of the election it was estimated that property taxes would be
cut by $600 million in the 1982 fiscal year and by $1.3 billion after
three years. Statewide, cities and towns will have to reduce their
property taxes by approximately 40 percent. But the cuts will be
unevenly distributed among the state's 351 cities and towns. Boston
will be the hardest hit. It has a large low-income population that
depends on the city for services, but is property tax base is riddled
with tax-exempt universities, churches, and government agencies. Boston's
taxes are the second highest in the C ommonwealth. Under Proposition 2-,
it will have to reduce its property taxes by 75 percent, about $383
million, over the next six to eight years. Other large cities face
property tax losses of 40 to 60 percent. Yet many of the state's
affluent suburbs and small towns will lose no or only a small portion
of property tax revenues.2
A complex measure, Proposition 2- requires more than just property
tax reductions. Its thirteen provisions are designed to change how
property taxes are collected and local government budget decisions are
made. First, it specifies that property taxes are to be limited to
52.5 percent of "full and fair cash valuation." Although all cities and
towns have been under court order since 1974 to reassess property
at 100 percent of value, less than a third had complied by 1980.
Municipalities were reluctant to use 100 percent valuation because an
increase in assessed value would lower their share of state aid. Most
lopal tax bases are thus signficantly undervalued. Under Proposition 2-,
cities and towns must reassess or risk an even greater loss in
property taxes. 3
If a city or town's property taxes exceeded 2.5 percent of its
full-value tax base in 1980, itmust reduce its property tax levy by 15
percent a year until the limit is reached. Boston and Chelsea, with
the highest property taxes in the state, will need as many as eight
years to reach their Proposition 2- rate limits. Another 41 cities and
towns will need three or more years, while 140 will need only one or
two years. The 165 cities and towns with 1980 property tax rates of
less than 2.5 percent of full value will not remain free of limits either.
Their limits will be equal to their 1979 tax rates -- set two years
before Proposition 2- appeared on the ballot and three years before it
will take affect.4
Once a city or town reduces its total tax levy to 2.5 percent of 1981
full and fair property values, or to the 1979 tax levy, its total
property tax levy becomes fixed. At that point, property tax levies may
only increase by 2.5 percent of the previous year's levy. There are no
allowances for population growth, inflation, or additions to the tax
base. If the tax base increases in value by more than 2.5 percent,
average property taxes will fall. If new homes or businesses are built,
6the city or town would have to provide municipal services although it
could not raise the additional revenue to pay for them. The effect
of this levy limit is dramatic. Cities and towns will now plan budgets
within a fixed tax levy, rather than prepare a budget and then determine
the tax levy as is now the case. 5
Prior to the adoption of Proposition 2,, local budgets and tax
rates were approved by the local legislative body, either town meetings
or city councils. Under the provisions of the initiative, if a city
or town wishes to increase or decrease, for a single year, its levy or
rate limit, it will need voter approval. A two-thirds vote is needed
to raise the levy or rate limit, a majority vote to lower them. This,
in effect, transfers final budget approval from the local legislative
body to the citizens.6
Proposition 22j changes more than just how the final budget total
is determined. It also changes who may influence components of the
budget. Under current law, local school committees have fiscal
autonomy. They prepare and approve the school budget and forward it
to the city council or town meeting. The local legislative body must
accept the school committee's budget, it can change neither the total
expenditure nor the distribution of money among programs. Proposition 2
abolishes school committee fiscal autonomy. School budgets will now be
subject to the same scrutiny and alterations as other departmental
requests. In addition, Proposition 2- weakens the ability of public
employee unions to bargain for higher wages or increased benefits. It
repeals binding arbitration for policemen and firemen. 7
In the past the state has also affected local budgets through
7mandates. It could require cities and towns to establish programs,
enforce regulations, or change personnel practices. Under Proposition 22,
the state may no longer force mandates on cities and towns unless the
legislature appropriates the money to pay their costs. In addition, if
a city or town accepts an optional program without state reimbursement,
it may rescind its acceptance after three years.
Only two levels of government in Massachusetts levy taxes: the
state and municipalities. Counties, authorities (e.g., the MBFTA), and
special districts (e.g., the MDC) are funded by the local property
tax. These quasi-governmental bodies assess the cities and towns within
their jurisdictions to raise revenue. The assessments are in turn
incorporated into the local property tax levy. Although assessments
can represent a large portion of local budgets, most county, authority,
or district budgets are not controlled by cities and towns. Proposition
2- prevents any county, special district, or authority from increasing
its assessment on a city or town by more than four percent a year.'
Proposition 2-k- also includes a provision intended to overcome the
objection that property tax reductions give landlords a windfall, but
provide no relief for renters. Under the measure, renters can deduct
one-half of their annual rent from their income when calculating
their state income tax. In addition, the 2.5 percent property tax
rate limit applies to all classes of real property, including automobiles.
The auto excise tax is thus reduced from $66 per $1000 of value to $25
per $100 of value. This reduction benefits all automobile owners,
whether renters or homeowners.'0
It is clear that Proposition 2- will bring large changes to the
8Massachusetts fiscal structure. If the legislature makes no changes to
the law, property taxes will be reduced by as much as $1.3 billion,
auto excise taxes by $190 million, and income taxes (through the
renter's deduction) by $47 million. Its provisions alter the manner
in which local budgets are prepared. The ability of cities and towns
to issue long-term bonds or obtain short-term credit has been impaired.
Many more cities and towns are reassessing property at full value. This
action is likely to shift the property tax burden from new property
owners to old property owners, and from commercial property owners to
residential property owners. If the legislature does amend the law,
even more signficant changes are possible. It could appropriate
additional state aid, authorize new taxes, or assume local services.
There is talk of abolishing counties, "level-funding" the state budget,
and taxing local. payrolls. In the long run, Proposition 24 is likely
to change who pays for public services, what public services are
available., and which level of government provides them. 1 1
Given the significance of Proposition 21.'s effects, I find it
worthwhile to explain why voters have approved the initiative.
An easy, conventional explanation is that voters wanted to reduce
property taxes and the size of local government. After all, this is
what the initiative is designed to do. It is also the philosophy of
the group that sponsored the initiative, the Citizens for Limited
Taxation. The much remarked upon conservative swing in the November
1980 Presidential election adds credibility to this argument.
Massachusetts voters chose a Republican President for the first time
in 28 years, since Dwight Eisenhower was elected president in 1952.
9Ronald Reagan campaigned with a promise to reduce the size of the
federal government and to cut taxes. Massachusetts voters endorsed
Reagan's plan and approved Proposition 21 to do the same at home. The
vote in favor of Proposition 2f, "overwhelming" in the words of the
Boston Globe, can be interpreted as a further sign that government is
too large and out of control. Massachusetts voters, like their counter-
parts in over 20 states in the past two years were simply ~
staging a "taxpayer's revolt." They were telling their legislators,
councilmen, aldermen, and mayors to limit the size, cost, and actions
of state and local government.12
But this conventional explanation is far too simple. It overlooks
two special features of Proposition 21 that suggest it is untrue.
First, Proposition 21 is different from most of the other taxing and
spending limits enacted during the two-year "taxpayer's revolt,"
There have been more than 40 taxing and spending initiatives on state
ballots since 1978. Most of the approved initiatives have applied to
state taxes and spending. The majority of the initiatives approved
by voters have limited the growth of future taxes not reduced present
taxes. In fact, only two other initiatives to reduce property taxes
have been approved by voters since 1978. In both cases, the success
of the initiative-can be directly related to rapidly rising residential
assessments, a problem that did not exist in Massachusetts.13
- Second, there is some evidence that Massachusetts voters are
satisfied with their local officials and their local services. Most
people did not believe that local governments were particularly
wasteful or corrupt. There is, however, considerable distrust and
10
dislike of the state government. Proposition 21 will require local
governments to reduce the quantity and quality of their services, but
places no restraints on the state government. Voter approval of
Proposition 2-1 seems inconsistent with their feelings about state and
local governments.
Because of these puzzling features of Proposition 2-, I would like
to take a closer look at the initiative and its background. By
studying the nature of taxing and spending limits, the history of
tax reform in Massachusetts, and the origins of Proposition 2-, I
hope to present an explanation of the initiative's success that is
more satisfying and conclusive than the "conservative swing" argument.
11
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CHAPTER TWO
A useful point of departure to study Proposition 21 is June 1978.
At that time California voters approved a constitutional amendment to
reduce property taxes 60 percent. The measure, Proposition 13 on the
ballot, received almost two of every three votes cast. This vote to
reduce property taxes was heralded as the beginning of a populist
"taxpayer's revolt." Individuals and groups across the country explored
ways to repeat the property tax cut in their own states. Massachusetts
was not an exception to this trend. Hoping to "take advantage of the
tidal wave of public protest," Representative Andrew S. Natsios and
three Republican colleagues introduced legislation for a similar cut
in Massachusetts property taxes to the General Court two days after
the California election. The measure was dubbed Proposition 2+
because it limited property taxes to 2.5 percent of full value. The
Republican's legislation was left to die at the end of the 1978
session. Nonetheless it introduced the idea of a 2.5 percent property
tax rate limit; the drive for property tax relief continued after
their initial defeat.1 Because Proposition 2,- is part of the recent
"taxpayer's revolt," it is important to understand its national context.
Before discussing the use of taxing and spending limits, it is
helpful to define the meaning of these terms. There is no single taxing
and spending limit adopted by governments. Rather, there are categories
of limits that are combined-in a particular law. At the most general
level, limits may be placed on taxes, expenditures, or revenues. Limits
may also be placed on debt. These are not discussed here because,
13
unlike taxing and spending limits, they are seldom proposed as
initiatives. Within each category a limit may be partial or inclusive.
For example, a limit may be placed on how much revenue is collected
from one tax -- say the property tax alone -- or from a series of
taxes -- say property, sales, and income taxes. Alternatively, a limit
may be placed. on the total expenditures made by a government, or some
exemptions may be granted. Fixed obligations such as pension costs or
debt obligations are often exempted from expenditure limits. A limit
on revenues may apply to only tax revenues or all sources of revenue,
including fees, fines, and user charges.
There are several other ways that taxing and spending limits may
differ. For example, a limit may apply to local governments, to the
state, to both, or separate limits may be placed on each. A limit may
also be fixed or variable. A fixe. limit specifies that tax collections,
revenues, or expenditures may not exceed a set amount, usually the
level for the year the legislation was passed. A variable limit allows
taxes, revenues, or expenditures to grow over time. Often, special
provisions are attached to a fixed limit to make it variable. The
base year amount may be increased to keep up with inflation, population
growth, or increased income. Alternatively, the tax rate may be
fixed; tax collections may continue to grow over time if the tax
base increases.
Limits may also be distinguished by the ease with which they may
be changed. A limit embodied in a state constitution is more difficult
to change than a law. The former may require voter approval, the
latter only the passage of a new bill by the state legislature. An
14
override provision may be included in the limit. It allows the limit
to be exceeded if enough votes are cast in favor. In some cases, the
override requires approval of the legislative body, in others it
requires approval of the voters. A simple majority vote may be required
to. override the limit, or a two-thirds or three-quarters vote may be
necessary.
These differences in taxing and spending limits are important
because they show that no two limits are alike. Each has been designed
to accomplish a purpose. Some limits are simply intended to clean
up tax administration or prevent abuse. Others are meant to keep
taxing and spending at their present levels and to prevent or control
future increases. The most extreme measures are often designed to
control future taxing or spending -and to reduce the current level of
2
taxing or spending. These differences in intent are important to
keep in mind when corparing taxing and spending limits across states.
How may Proposition 22 be characterized in terms of the features
discussed above? The measure approved by Massachusetts voters is an
extreme tax limit proposal. It has both a tax rate limit and a tax
levy limit. The property tax rate limit of 2.5 percent of full value
is almost one-half the 1980 statewide average; overtime property tax
collections will fall by as much as $1.3 billion. Once a city or town
reaches the Proposition 2- limit, its tax levy is fixed at that
amount. There is a small growth factor of 2.5 percent a year permitted.
There are no allowances for population growth, inflation, or increased
assessments. Fixed obligations of the cities and towns are included.
in the limit. The auto excise tax cut further reduces local government
15
revenues. With the exception of the renter's credit, which does not
prevent the state from raising taxes, the initiative applies to only
one level of government: cities and. towns. There are some softening
aspects in the law. It does include an override provision. The state
is prohibited from requiring cities and towns to accept mandates
without being reimbursed for their full costs. In general, Proposition
2 is a conservative tax limit law. It is intended to reduce property
taxes and local government revenues.
Proposition 21, Proposition 13, and other taxing and spending
initiatives do not embody new ideas. The first property tax limit
was enacted in Rhode Island in 1870. And property tax limits have
been usedcontinuously since then. By 1976, 40 states limited the
ability of local governments to raise revenue from property taxes. Of
these states, 15 had adopted property tax limits since 1970. Proposition
13 and its successors differ from existing laws because they were
adopted through the initiative process; most of the existing laws have
4been enacted by state legislators. Given this basic difference in
their origin, it is worthwhile to briefly review the history of
taxing and spending limits to see how they differ from the initiatives
of the late 1970s "taxpayer's revolt."
The history of legislative taxing and spending limits can be
broken into three broad periods: the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centures, the Great Depression, and the early 1970s. As noted
above, Rhode Island imposed the first property tax rate limit in 1870.
It was followed by states such as Nevada in 1895, Oklahoma in 1907,
Ohio in 1911, and Arizona in 1921. These laws were most often passed
16
in response to problems with the property tax. At the turn-of-the-
century, many municipalities were incurring large amounts of debt,
usually in the name of public construction. As part of their efforts
to control local borrowing, several states set property tax rate limits.
At. the same time property values were rising rapidly from speculation
and inflation in many areas. Assessments lagged far behind property
values. When reformers pushed for reassessment many taxpayers feared
their taxes would increase because local governments would not lower
tax rates. Ohio's one percent ceiling on property tax rates was
passed in 1910 to ensure that local governments reduced their tax rates
proportional to assessment increases. Taxing and spending limits were
sometimes passed to constrain the resources of political machines, or
to punish urban governments which were considered irresponsible by
rural legislatures. In general, these early limits were liberal and
did not severly inhibit the growth of local revenues or the provision
of local services.
A second wave of property tax limits occurred during the 1930s.
This time the problem was- not rising assessments but falling ones.
Prior to the Great Depression property values had increased rapidly
due to speculation. There had been little pressure on municipalities
to control spending because the economy was healthy; tax rates remained
the same and cities reaped a windfall from the rising assessments.
However, when the economy worsened in the early 1930s, property values
fell. Cities wanted to increase tax rates to raise sufficient revenue.
But property owners were hard pressed to pay their tax bills even
with lower assessed values, and tax delinquencies increased. Economic
17
collapse had highlighted the inadequacies of the property tax and
pressure again mounted for tax rate limitation, this time to ensure
property tax relief. Several states passed new limits, including
Indiana, Washington, New Mexico, Michigan, and West Virginia. Many of
them made up for lost property tax revenues by designating some sales
and income tax revenues for local governments. 6
After World War II, local revenues diversified.. This was due to
increased state and federal aid to local governments as well as the
adoption of local sales and income taxes. In most states the property
tax assumed an increasingly smaller proportion of local government
revenues. As long as the economy was healthy, property taxes were only
annoying, not destructive. As a result, the next strong movement to
limit property taxes did not appear until the early 19?0s with the
advent of chronic inflation. This time, many of the limits were imposed
as part of property tax relief programs.
For a time property tax relief demanded national attention.
President Nixon pledged federal aid for property tax relief in his 1972
campaign. In 1973, Senator Edmund Muskie sponsored legislation to
modernize property tax administration. "Tax Revolt" became a popular
phrase. Throughout the decade, 18 states adopted new controls on local
powers to tax and spend. Most of these measures were modest, quiet
efforts to limit tax burdens and to control spending. Most were tied
to legislative tax reform or relief. For example, many were imposed
when states increased local aid, assumed local services, ordered
massive reassessments, authorized new taxes to diversify
18
local revenues, or equalized state aid. Indiana allowed counties to
adopt a local income tax beginning in 1974 if all the local governments
kept their property tax levies at the 1973 level. After 1975, Wisconsin
municipalities could not increase their property tax levies by more
than the rate at which property values increased. At the same time
the state enacted a new revenue-sharing program and took over the costs
of many county functions. -
What general conclusions can be drawn from a century's experience
with property tax limits? First, most of the limits were intended to
reform the administration or use'of the property tax. The first limits
were passed to correct perceived abuses of the property tax that came
from rising assessments, political skulduggery, or fiscal irresponsibility.
In the 1930s limits were intended to protect homeowners from excessive
property taxes during the Great Depression. In the early 1970s
most of the limits were part of state legislatures' attempts to reform
the state-local fiscal system. Second, these measures were not intended
to control or reduce the size of governments. They were attempts to
prevent abuse and improve state and local finances. They were not
angry backlashes at government. Fianlly, as the measures were passed
by legislatures they were subject to scrutiny, change, and compromise
before enactment. They did not represent the proposal of only one
individual or group, nor were they subject to single-issue voting as
initiatives are.
Following the passage of Propcsition 13, yet another series of
taxing and spending limits were enacted. In a significant departure
from the past, however, most of the limits adopted from 1978 to 1980
19
were initiatives not legislative actions. In addition, many were
constitutional amendments, much more difficult to change over time
than laws. Finally, the initiatives often applied to state as well as
local governments.
Proposition 13 was the first successful initiative written to
limit or lower taxes since the Great Depression. It was followed by
an unprecedented number of initiatives in other states. In November
1978, there were 22 initiatives on 17 state ballots concerned with state
or local taxing and spending. Between 1978 and 1980, at least 44 taxing
and spending proposals appeared on ballots in 22 of the 25 states
that permit initiatives? It is not surprising that many observers
have referred to the last three years as an "era of tax revolt." 7ut
has there really been a tax revolt? Do voters, as the phrase implies,
want to cut taxes and reduce the size of government? And why were
taxing and spending initiatives successful in the 1970s when they had
been soundly defeated in the past? By looking at the recent initiatives,
their designs, and their success or failure, it is possible to ferret
out some answers to these questions.
As discussed earlier in this chapter there is no single "right"
way to limit spending or taxing. It is not surprising to find that the
44 initiatives are as varied as the 22 states they appeared in. Among
them, 26 applied only to local governments, 11 to state governments,
and 7 to both. All of the local limits were designed to restrict,
reform, or lower property taxes. Four of the state limits and five of
the combined limits proposed restrictions on future spending. The
remaining applied to sales and income taxes. The initiatives also
20
varied according to their intent. There were 18 proposals to limit
the growth of taxes or expenditures, 16 to reduce taxes, and 10 to
reform the collection and. administration of taxes.
The election results for the 44 initiatives reveal an important
characteristic of the "taxpayer's revolt": most voters chose to limit
rather than reduce taxes and expenditures. Of the 18 proposals to limit
future increases in taxes or expenditures, 14 passed and 4 failed. Most
of these applied to state governments. In general they were flexible,
tying spending increases to inflation or growth in state income. They
allowed states to maintain their existing level of services, but gave
the taxpayer protection from future increases. There were 16 proposals
to reduce state or local tax collections; 5 passed and 11 failed. Of
these measures, 13 applied to the local property tax and only 4 were
approved. Most of the property tax initiatives were variations on
Proposition 13 and proposed large cuts in property taxes. Finally, there
were 10 proposals to reform tax collections -- allowing property
classification, returning budget surpluses to taxpayers, shifting
from property taxes to state taxes, and requiring tax rates to fall
when assessments rise -- ,5 passed and 5 failed. These mixed results
are understandable given the complex nature of the proposals and the
lack of easily- identified benefits,.
The significance of the election results is clear. Voters were
willing to place limits on increases in future taxes or expenditures,
but were far less willing to significantly reduce existing revenues.
Also, proposals to control state taxes and spending were far more
likely to be approved than those that affected local governments. These
21
two conclusions suggest that the "taxpayer's revolt" was not all that
revolutionary, it was not a movement to reduce taxes or the size of
government. Rather, voters expressed a desire to control future
taxing and spending. States were the more likely target of these
proposals because they did not have a history of tax or expenditure
limits. Local governments did, and were "protected" from the reduction
proposals. For example, in November1978, Oregon voters rejected a
Proposition 13 proposal to reduce property tax rates to 1.5 percent
of market value. Unlike California, Oregon had already imposed property
tax controls. An increase of more than six percent in a local property
tax levy required voter approval. As taxpayers had protection from
unreasonable tax increases, there was little incentive tc reduce
property taxes.10
But what of the four states that voted to reduce property taxes?
What accounts for their divergence from other states? In one state,
Nevada, the election is fairly easily explained. In November 1978, almost
four out of five Nevada voters approved an identical version of
Proposition 13. However, in Nevada a constitutional amendment must he
approved by voters in two successive general elections. In 1978, voters
could vote yes on the amendment and protest property taxes without
facing service cuts. In 1980, when the amendment would become effective,
Nevada voters defeated it. Some observers have also debated whether
Proposition 13, which cut property taxes by 60 percent, should be
considered a tax reduction vote. Many voters did not believe Proposition
13 would result in large service cutbacks because the state government
had a $5 billion surplus; they expected the state to "bail out" the local
22
governments. These voters were correct. In July 1978, Governor Jerry
Brown made up for most of the $6.2 billion property tax loss with $4
billion in state aid. Although Proposition 13 reduced property taxes,
it did not significantly reduce the size of local governments.11
In only two states have voters approved large property tax cuts:
Idaho and Massachusetts. The story of the Massachusetts vote will be
unraveled in later chapters. In November 1978, Idaho voters approved
a constitutional amendment to limit the property tax rate to 1 percent
of market value. There was no state surplus to make up for the 60
percent loss in property tax revenues. A plausible explanation for
this vote is that there had been a massive shift in the property tax
burden onto homeowners in the years just prior to the election. Because
of court-ordered full-value reassessment, the residential share .of
the property tax burden increased from 24 percent in 1969 to 44 percent
in 1978. Most of the increase occurred in 1976. In 1978, Idaho voters
approved "Proposition 1" by a margin of almost three to two. 1 2
The experiences of Nevada, California, and Idaho tend to underscore
the conclusion that the "taxpayer's revolt" was not a movement to cut
back the size of government. Voters in these states, who had approved
the most extreme tax cuts, were protesting a property tax burden that
was too large. There is no evidence that they wanted less local govern-
ment. The "taxpayer's revolt" is more properly interpreted as a
movement to control spending than to cutback government. However,
this explanation does not account for the large number of taxing and
spending initiatives that appeared on state ballots between 1978 and
1980. Given the long history of taxing and spending limits, why was
23
there a rash of initiatives in the late 1970s?
One answer to this question is that not all states had limits.
Massachusetts was among this group until 1978. And. in many states with
limits, the limits were ineffective. California, for example, froze
tax rates at their 1972 levels. But housing prices and assessed values
increased so rapidly that the rate freeze was meaningless. Municipalities
did not lower tax rates when assessments rose, they merely collected
the additional revenue. Arizona's tax limit law passed in 1921 was
so widely violated by the 1970s that the League of Arizona Towns and
Cities published a manual on how to legally evade the limit. In other
cases, the limits applied only to local governments. Many of the
successful initiatives in the late 1970s were aimed at state spending
as well. 3
Another factor behind the new interest in tax limits was the
unintended consequences of assessment reform. Local assessment practices
had long been assailed for their deficiencies. Assessments on many
properties were decades old, and as a result, much lower than those
for new, comparable properties. Different classes of property were
often assessed at different rates despite the passage of laws requiring
equal assessment-. Fecause most assessments were done at the local
level, similar properties in different cities and counties were often
assessed unequally. In the 1960s and 1970s many states moved to
improve assessing administration and required reassessment at full value
of all property. Reassessments were done annually or biannually instead
of once a decade. As a result, in many places the property tax burden
shifted from commercial property owners, traditionally overassessed,
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to residential property owners, traditionally underassessed. This trend
was exacerbated when inflation, speculation, and increased demand caused
residential property values to rise faster than those for commercial
property. Thus, by the lates 1970s in many states, a homeowner would
have found his tax bill was increasing even if local expenditures and
tax rates had not increased.1 4
Finally, economics plays a large part in the taxpayers revolt.
By the end of the decade, high inflation had become a frighteningly
permanent part of the nation's economy. For the first time in many
decades, real, after-tax income levelled off and declined. Inflation
pushed taxpayers into higher marginal income tax brackets even though
they had no real increase in income. Ballot initiatives to reduce
or limit taxing and spending offered the voter a chance to control at
least one of his spiralling costs.15
This review of taxing and spending limits helps to put Proposition
2-y into perspective. It is part of the national taxpayers revolt of the
late 1970s. Like its counterparts in other states, Proposition 2L was a
grass-roots, citizens initiative to control taxes and spending. However,
unlike other initiatives, Proposition 2-1 was one of the few laws to
reduce property taxes that voters approved. In many ways Proposition 2-,
was a unique taxpayers revolt that can only be explained by the history
of taxes and tax reform in Massachusetts.
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CHAPTER THREE
Property taxes have been a problem in Massachusetts as early as
1900. They really became a problem, however, after World War II.
According to the legislature's 1945 Special Commission on Real Estate
Taxation, the state was in poor economic health and property taxes were
contributing to its economic decline. The commission concluded that
real estate was "grossly, even dangerously, overtaxed," and that without
relief several cities and towns were likely to "collapse." As a
solution it recommended both tax levy and expenditure limits. Almost
20 years later demands for tax relief still echoed across the state.
Frank J. Zeo, director of the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, told
a Boston Herald reporter about taxpayers' woes in 1963. "The local tax
burden is the state's biggest single policy problem," he said, adding
that "It w.ould take $300,000,000 to reduce the 1963 local tax total
to the national average." The drive for property tax relief had been
a "30 years war." If the legislature failed to provide more school aid
that year it could touch off a "general taxpayers revolt," an event
Zeo described as "a grassroots fire that would singe the coat-tails of
the legislature." In 1978 when the campaign for Proposition 2- began,
the property tax problem had not been resolved. The origins and the
success of the initiative are related to two aspects of the Massachusetts
tax system: property taxes have long been high, and the legislature
has consistently failed to enact property tax reform.
Massachusetts taxes are among the highest in the nation. In 1977,
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per capita state and local taxes were $1002 -- the fifth highest and
25 percent higher than the national average of $813. State and local
taxes represented 15.1 percent of the state's personal income, almost
20 percent more than the national proportion of 12.8 percent. In only
five other states did taxes consume .a higher proportion of personal
income. Two years later, per capita state and local taxes in Massachusetts
were up to $1176, while the national average was only $934. Only
Alaska, New York, and Hawaii had higher per capita property taxes. And
Massachusetts taxes had increased at a faster rate -- 17.3 percent --
than the national average of 14.8 percent.2
Within this burdensore tax system, the property tax is relied on
heavily. In 1977 property taxes represented 49.1 percent of all state
and local taxes in Massachusetts; nationwide the proportion was only
35.6 percent. Only Alaska relied more heavily on property taxes but
it taxed oil, gas, and minerals as property in addition to real estate.
Massachusetts cities and towns received 99.4 percent of their "own
source" tax revenues, which excludes state and federal aid as well as
user fees and charges, from property taxes. The national average was
only 80.6 percent. This overuse of the property tax led to high
property tax rates and burdens. In 1978, the average effective tax
rate on a single-family home with a FHA-insured mortgage was 3.6
percent in Massachusetts; across the country it was only two-fifths
this rate. Per capita property taxes were $491 in 1977, almost 70
percent above the national average of $289 and second only to Alaska' s.
Property tax burdens were also regressive. In 1978, a central city
homeowner with an income of $10,500 a year paid 11.6 percent of it in
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property taxes, while a person earning $27,000 paid only 5.5 percent.
In the suburbs, the figures were 8.9 percent and 4.8 percent respectively.3
These high tax figures were not an aberration. Massachusetts
taxes have been among the highest in the country for decades. In 1953
per capita state and local taxes were $167, 25 percent higher than
the national average of $132 and the fourth highest. Since then, the
state has always been among the top five states in terms of per capita
taxes. In addition, state and local taxes have placed an increasingly
heavy burden on personal income. In 1953 state and local taxes
represented 8.8 percent of personal income in Massachusetts; fifteen
states had higher tax burdens. In 1977 taxes were 15.1 percent of
personal income, the sixth highest.4
Property taxes have also been high over time. In 1942, 67.2
percent of state and local taxes in Massachusetts were property taxes;
the national average was 53.2 percent. Thirty years later the
Massachusetts proportion had fallen to 51.2 percent but the national
average had fallen to 39.1 percent. Although property taxes represented
a smaller proportion of total state and local revenue over time, they
also became the only "own source" tax for local governments in the state.
In 1942, property taxes were 95.9 percent of local taxes in Massachusetts
and 92.4 percent nationwide. Thirty years later the national average
had fallen to 83.7 percent but the Massachusetts proportion had risen
to 99.4 percent. Not surprisingly, in 1942 per capita property taxes
were 61.7 percent higher than the national average; by 1977 they were
69.8 percent higher.5
These figures suggest two important points about Massachusetts
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property taxes. First, taxes have always been higher than the national
average. Second, while other states have moved away from the property
tax as a source of local government revenues, it has become a more
important source in Massachusetts. By the late 1970s, Massachusetts'
state and local tax system was skewed. Half of its revenue was raised
by the property tax and it ranked 42nd among the states in terms of a
balanced use of income, sales, and property taxes. The state's flat
rate income tax has a $2000 exemption that is eroded by inflation.
The sales tax almost exempts more than it taxes. Similar.to the
property tax, state income taxes-were 68 percent above the national
average in 1979. But sales tax collections were low, only one-half the
national average. In terms of sales taxes per $1000 income, Massachusetts
ranks 45th. And user fees and charges were the second lowest in the
country. Shortly before the Proposition 2+ election, liberal journalist
Robert Kuttner wrote in the Boston Globe that Massachusetts voter s would
be likely to vote for Proposition 2,, "not by the level of our taxes,
but by the way in which we collect them." 6
There have been numerous attempts to reform or limit property
taxes in Massachusetts. Property tax limits have long been advocated
as a means to lower property taxes and control expenditures. In 1895,
the legislature established a property tax rate limit of $12.00, or
1.2 percent of value. The limit was abolished for all cities except
Boston in 1913. Boston's limit was removed in 1936. During the
Depression, a group of realtors and businessmen organized as the
"People's 25 Dollar Tax Limit Committee, Inc." In 1936 the circulated
an initiative for a constitutional amendment to reduce property taxes
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20 percent by limiting them to "21 percent of the fair cash value."
When the amendment was submitted to the General Court in 1936 the
legislators challenged it in the courts. The Supreme Judicial Court
found it defective and the proposal died. The.1945 Special Commission
on. Real Estate Taxation also advocated tax limits. In 1974, the Greater
Boston Real Estate Board proposed a 4 percent property tax rate limit
to the legislature. It was designed to put "an end to the Commonwealth's
excessive reliance on the property tax." Between 1932 and 1980, 126
proposals were put before the legislature to limit property taxes or
local spending. Although it has always been widely acknowledged that
Massachusetts relied too heavily on the property tax, none of these
proposals was enacted.7
In addition to the unsuccessful property tax limitation efforts,
several attempts have been made to provide property tax relief in the
last few decades. In 1957 Governor Foster Furcolo first propose. the
adoption of a state sales tax to increase local aid and to lower
property taxes. Under his proposal, property tax levies would be
reduced by 75 percent of the amount of the new state aid. Property
tax limits would also be set with 1957 as the base year. The bill
was not approved-in 1957. It was refiled 14 times without success
between 1957 and 1964 by Governor Furcolo and 9 legislators. In 1965,
Governor John A. Volpe introduced a new sales tax bill that placed
limits on local expenditures. The 3 percent sales tax was adopted in
1966 when the expenditure controls were deleted from the bill. The
bill was passed with the understanding that a portion of the new
revenues would be used to reduce property taxes but there was no
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requirement to this effect. At the same time, the state took over
welfare administration from the cities and towns in order to lower
local costs. In 1966 there was virtually no statewide increase in
property taxes. Later, the sales tax was increased to five percent and
a state lottery was established. Both were intended in part to
reduce property taxes. But despite these tax changes property taxes
continued to rise.8
The last overall attempt by the legislature to reform the skewed
Massachusetts tax structure began in 1968. After 3 years of study,
the Special Commission to Develop a Master Tax Plan recommended in 1971
that the state's excessive reliance on the property tax be reduced. It
recommended that sales and income taxes by raised and property taxes be
lowered. The Commission further proposed that the state increase aid from
20 percent of local budgets to 80 percent. Local aid would be based
on school enrollments and. populaton. To garner suIfficient state revenue
to pay for the plan, it proposed that most local property taxes by
replaced with a statewide property tax. The drastic changes proposed
9by the commission were never adopted.
Two Governors have also attempted to relieve property taxes in the
last few years. In 1978 Governor Michael S. Dukakis pushed a sharply
increased state aid bill through the General Court as an answer to
voter demands for property tax relief. His generous state aid package
was, in Robert Kuttner's words, "pure carrot and no stick." It did not
require cities and towns to lower property taxes. The $300 million
in new state aid was expected to reduce property taxes by ten percent.
However, many mayors and selectmen said it was barely enough to keep
33
up with inflation, labor agreements, and META and DC assessments.
Although property taxes did not rise sharply in 1978, few localities
lowered their tax levies. Kuttner has another explanation for why
taxes were not reduced, each "mayor suddenly had a lot of new money
for pet projects and a mysterious grin on his face."10
Dukakis was beaten in the gubernatorial primary by conservative
Democrat Edward J. King who ran on a platform of property tax relief.
During the campaign King pledged to enact a "zero cap" on property taxes.
When he took office in 1979, King faithfully proposed his zero cap
legislation to the General Court. The bill applied to cities, towns,
counties and districts. 1979 was to be the base expenditure year and
there would be no allowance for inflation. The bill was revised
extensively by the legislature's Committee on Taxation. The approved
bill was only effective for two years, allowed a 4 percent annual
increase in expenditures, and permitted local legislative override of
the limit. Although the tax cap successfully held down tax rates in
1979, in 1980 they took their first big jump in three years -- just
11
weeks before the Proposition 21 election.
Massachusetts found'itself with an uneven tax system in the 1970s
because the state legislature consistently failed to vote for property
tax reform or relief. The few bills that were passed were done so largely
through the work of Governors whom the legislators only went along with
grudgingly. The gubernatorial bills tended to be piecemeal solutions
that were not effective at controlling or reducing property taxes. The
new taxes that were passed to reduce property taxes did not do so. No
strong controls on local spending.or taxing were enacted. Comprehensive
'2h
proposals to revamp the state's lopsided tax system were seldom proposed,
and when proposed they were rejected. Representative Andrew S. Natsios,
a Republican who helped write Proposition 2- in 1978, believes that
voters no longer trust the legislature to pass new taxes that will
lower the property tax. Experience with the sales tax and the lottery
has shown that new taxes lead to higher overall taxes, not lower property
taxes. This belief has contributed to the three defeats by voters in
recent years of graduated income tax proposals. There is now a built-in
resistance to change that makes it difficult to propose property tax
relief through a broadened sales tax or a progressive income tax.12
There are at least three explanations for why the legislature fails
to deal with tax reform. One is that it is not possible to build a
constituency for tax reform. No single group or class benefits enough
from tax reform; reduced property taxes combined with higher sales and
income taxes distribute the costs and benefits of reform too thinly.
Michael Capuano, legislative aide to Committee on Taxation Chairman Gerald
D. Cohen, remarks that he could write a "perfect" tax reform bill, but
asks, "how many votes would it get on the floor?" A second view is that
voters no longer trust their legislators to reform the tax system. After
the sales tax, lottery, and Dukakis state aid fiascos people are fearful
of new taxes that are supposed to lower property taxes. The most
critical explanation is that the Democratic Leadership in the legislature --
House Speaker Thomas W. McGee, Senate President William Bulger, and
former Ways and Means Committee Chairman John Finnegan -- do not want
to reform taxes. Just before the Proposition 2- election McGee
commented on the property tax problem, "We have not voted tax reform in
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the 18 years I've been here, and I don't believe we'll vote tax reform
in the next 18 years." Representative Natsios maintains that the
leadership is too "ignorant" and "short-sighted" to reform the property
tax. Their goal is to maintain the status quo and to protect members
for re-election. Most of the leaders have been in office so long that
they feel secure and are "out-of-touch" with their constituents. On
any matter, they respond only to crises.
This history of Massachusetts taxes and tax reform sets the stage
for Proposition 21-. For decades property taxes had been way above the
national average and the legislature could not or would not enact
tax reform. Because the tax system remained skewed and remedies had
failed, there were several obs&tacles to property tax reform by the late
1970s. Most people acknowledged the need for tax reform but few knew
a solution. It is within this "intolerable" context that the Citizens
for Limited Taxation designed Proposition 2 -.
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CHAPTER FOUR
When California voters approved Proposition 13 in June 1978 a new
movement to limit Massachusetts property taxes began. Within days of
the election the Boston Globe reported that "A conservative tide is
running in the nation and the ripples have already been felt in
Massachusetts." The roston Herald-American aksed its readers to respond.
to several alternative tax limitation proposals. Almost all of the 14,000
respondents wanted a property tax limit. Slightly more than half
supported the idea of a 2.5 perc-nt property tax rate limit; only 15
asked to "count me out of the tax revolt. A Boston Globe poll of
Massachusetts voters found that three out of four favored a 45 percent
tax cut, two out of three favored the cut even if public services were
cut, and one-half favored it even if "social unrest" were a result.
Three days after Proposition 13 was approved, Representatives Royall
H. Switzler from Wellesley, Nils L. Nordberg from Reading, Andrew S.
Natsios from Holliston, and Robert C. Buell from Boxford introduced "An
Act Reducing Local Property Taxes" into the General Court. Hoping to
"take advantage of the tidal wave of-public protest, the Republican
legislators introduced a Massachusetts version of Proposition 13. Because
there was only one month left in the legislature's 1978 session, they
combined . several small property tax reform bills that had been
defeated in the past and added a 2.5 percent tax rate limit. Given
the high effective property tax rates in Massachusetts cities and towns --
they averaged over 4.5 percent -- the legislators chose 2.5 percent as
a "fairer" tax rate limit than the I percent limit of Proposition 13.2
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The bill filed by Switzler and the other Republicans was only
loosely based on Proposition 13. It went much further in defining the
state's role in local finances. It required the legislature to fully
fund all existing and future programs they mandated local governments
to provide. State aid for education was to be automatically given to
cities and towns, there would be no discretionary annual appropriation
from the legislature. The bill also proposed change.s in local budget
practices. Binding arbitration for MBTA employees, policemen, and firemen
would be repealed. School committees would lose their fiscal autonomy.
All debt service payments were excluded from the tax rate limit, but
debt issued after the bill became law would require local voter approval.
The legislation was intended to reform the state-local tax structure in
three ways. First, the state's excessive reliance on the property tax
was to be reduced. Second, local governments were to be given more
authority to limit or reduce their costs. And third, the state was to
become, in the words of Representative Natsios, "more responsible" in its
fiscal relations with cities and towns. 3
Before the legislature could take any action on the Republican's
Proposition 21, the Senate and the House of Representatives each had to
agree to admit the late-filed bill for consideration. In the wake of
Proposition 13 there was considerable public pressure to admit the bill.
The House agreed to admit the bill on June 14 and the Senate concurred
on June 19. Nonetheless the outlook for its passgge was not encouraging.
The Boston Globe reported that many legislators "suggested privately"
that the bill would be "studied to death." Others admitted that the
bill was "politically impossible to oppose in an election year," but
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predicted it "would not get beyond the public hearing stage." One
legislator, Representative H. Thomas Colo of Athol criticized the
House vote as "phoney." Because the bill was likely to die at the
end of the session he felt the vote deceived voters who hoped the
legislature would cut property taxes. 4
Soon after Proposition 2-i- was filed the Republican legislators
met and began to work with Donald Feder, the head of a small grass-
roots taxpayers organization called the Citizens for Limited Taxation.
Edward F. King, a conservative West Roxbury businessman, had organized
CLT in 1973 to, in his words, "change the debate from which taxes to
raise to balance the state budget, to one emphasizing the control and
limitation of taxing and spending." King and two other co-founders wanted
to reduce state and local taxes; they considered equitable tax reform
a secondary issue. CLT functioned as a lobbyist for the taxpayer, who
they defined as "someone who earns and then has some of his earnings
confiscated by the government." Their goal was to protect the taxpayer
from special interest groups who get "that which the taxpayer gave."
The leaders of CLT worked to "keep as much of the taxpayer's check" in
his own pocket as possible. CLT's view on taxation is best summarized
by their motto: "The only alternative to tax limitation is unlimited
taxation.,,5
By 1978 CLT had some tax limitation successes to boast of. In
1976 an initiative to amend the state constitution to permit a graduated
state income tax appeared on the ballot. It was defeated by a three-to-
one margin; CLT led the campaign against the amendment. Because the
November 1976 defeat was the third rejction of the graduated income tax
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in fifteen years, many observers of 'Reacon Hill felt that it would never
again be proposed.6
After the defeat of what CLT saw as another tax increase -- the
graduated income.tax -- they decided to use the initiative process to
achieve their goal of tax limitation. In 1977 King, Feder, and a group
of eight businessmen and legislators wrote an initiative for an
amendment to limit state spending and revenue collection. Known as the
"King Amendment, it placed a "limitation ratio" on the state budget. In
any year, the ratio of total state expenditures to personal income could
not exceed the average ratio for the past three years. The amendment
also required the state to return surplus revenues to taxpayers, and
prevented the legislature from requiring cities and towns to adopt new
programs without providing state money to pay for them.
CLT had to collect signatures from 56,000 registered voters to place
the "King Amendment" on the ballot. Their signature drive, which lasted
from September to December 1977, attracted national attention. The drive
began with a fund-raising luncheon at the Poston Park Plaza Hotel in mid-
September. The guest speaker was Nobel laureate Milton Friedman who
remarked that tax limits, like the King Amendment, were "our only hope."
In the middle of.October, Barron's reported on the progress of the
signature drive and commented: "Few states have lived so brazenly beyond
their means as Massachusetts, and few have so little to show for their
profligacy." And when the CLT volunteers had collected 120,000 signatures
and certified 87,000 -- 31,000 more than required -- by the filing deadline,
the Wall Street Journal asked, "Will Massachusetts be the first state to
set tax limits?" The newspaper emphasized the significance of the
initiative: "most political observers say Washington would look up and
listen if the plan succeeded in Massachusetts, a liberal, populous,
Eastern-establishment state with lots of political coverage."8
Massachusetts has an indirect initiative process. Once the
required signatures are collected an initiative is submitted to the
legislature. An initiative for a constitutional amendment must be
approved by one-fourth of the members of the General Court in two
successive joint sessions known as Constitutional Conventions. Thus,
in 1978, 70 legislators had to vote in favor of the King Amendment to
keep it alive. It would also have to be approved by the next General
Court, in either 1979 or 1980, in oxder to appear on the November 1980
ballot.9
In early May of 1978, the joint Committee on Taxation recommended
that the King Amendment "ought not to pass." They specified two strong
objections to the initiative. F'irst, the Committee felt the wording was
vague and would not limit further substantial increases in state taxes.
Second, the Committee stated that the King Amendment did "nothing to
resolve the Commonwealth's most critical tax problem -- the need to reduce
the burden of the local property tax." Despite the adverse Committee
report, Feder told the Wall Street Journal in early June that he had
74 firm votes in favor of CLT's initiative. The Constitutional Convention
was not scheduled until later in the month and he hoped to have more
votes by then. Therefore, on the morning of the Proposition 13 vote,
the Wall Street Journal wrote that "the next battleground may well be
Massachusetts."10
It is at this point that CLT and the Republican legislators began
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to work together. While pushing his initiative towards approval, Feder
also advocated the Republican's Proposition 21. With the passage of
Proposition 13 there was considerable public pressure on the legislators
to address tax limitation before the session ended. On June 23, the
legislature approved the King Amendment by a vote of 222 to 23. However,
as Boston Globe columnist David B. Wilson later wrote about the legislators,
"profiles in courage they are not." The representatives and senators
voted against future tax increases when they approved the King Amendment.
They did not have to address current levels of spending or taxing. There
was nc guarantee that the King Amendment would ever become law. It
was a symbolic, politically useful vote on the heels of Proposition 13.
But it was not a message, as Donald Feder hoped, that the state could no
longer spend "taxpayer's money as though we had given it a blank check."
At the same time the legislature approved the King Amendmaent they
sidetracked Proposition 2-i-. Representative Vincent J. Piro, chairman of
the Committee on Taxation, accused the bill's sponsors of intimidating
the Committee and exploiting Proposition 13. In early July, the Committee
recommended that the bill be turned down. The same day, the bill was
referred to the Ways and Means Committee. Representative Royall H.
Switzler attempted on three separate days to have the bill discharged
from the Ways and Means Committee. Each time his motion was narrowly
defeated. On July 12 the legislature adjourned and the first Proposition
1227 died in Committee.
There are several possible explanations for why the legislature
did not want to deal with the issues brought up by Proposition 2.
First, the King Amendment allowed them to vote for tax limits without
addressing property taxes. Second, many of the bill's opponents felt that
its sponsors knew it was flawed and did not really try to push it through
the legislature. Third, the House of Representatives was being.reduced
from 240 to 160 seats and many representatives faced tough elections in
the fall. As a result, there was bitter infighting among colleagues and
the legislature was unable to address a difficult issue like property tax
limitation. Finally, in the view of Representative Natsios, the Democratic
leadership of the House did not want to address the issue. It was
therefore impossible to bring the bill to the floor for a vote,'3
Advocates of property tax limits did not give up-when the legislature
left Proposition 21 to die in committee. The legislators adjourned and
"went home to campaign" on July 12. The following day, Feder announced
that OLT and Representatives Natsics, Switzler, Buell and Nordberg planned
to write and circulate an initiative to cut property taxes. In the next
few weeks, through a "long series of emotional meetings," COLT members and
the representatives drafted a 30-page initiative for submission to the
Attorney General. The initiative was based on the earlier bill but was
more detailed. In addition to the provisions of its predecessor, it
allowed cities and towns to rescind their acceptance of over 200 state
programs, transferred county budget approval from the legislature to
local officials, required that a fixed percentage of state revenues be
distributed automatically to cities and towns, and prevented user charges
from exceeding the cost-of services.1 4
CLT and the Republican representatives were first brought together
at the suggestion of Warren T. Brookes, the conservative Poston Herald-
American columnist. The alliance seemed to make sense. The representatives
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offered CLT a much broader coalition to support their tax cutting efforts.
In turn, CLT could provide the legislators with the volunteers they needed
to collect signatures. But the alliance between Feder and the representa-
tives was uneasy at best. Although both groups were conservative they
differed in degree. The representatives felt that Feder and other CLT
members were unbending "ideologues" interested only in large tax cuts,
not reform or continued public services. CLT was inexperienced, in their
view, and unfamiliar with local government and the "mess" likely to result
from their initiative. CLT, on the other hand, felt that it was
compromising too much and losing sight of its tax reduction goal.15
Despite their differences, the coalition perservered and submitted
an initiative petition to the Attorney General in early August. They
were not the only group to do so. Four others had filed initiatives that
proposed property tax rate limits of from t to 2.5 percent. While the
the Attorney General reviewed the proposals for consistency with the
state's constitution, CLT continued to keep the tax reduction issue alive.
After filing the initiative, CLT announced its signature drive. In late
August, Howard Jarvis came to Boston as part of a national tour to promote
property tax limits. Speaking to a small audience at Fanieul Hall, well
attended by CLT members, Jarvis praised Proposition 21 as "an idea that
is overdue in Taxachusetts."16
In September, Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti dealt a fatal
blow to the initiative. He refused to allow it to be circulated, saying
that it violated the constitution by treating some cities and counties
differently than others. This finding angered CLT and. the Republicans.
The disputed provisions were special provisions for Boston and Suffolk
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County that they had included in the initiative because existing laws
treated them differently from other cities and counties. They felt the
Attorney General had disqualified their initiative on minor technicalities
that could have been resolved in enough time to circulate the petitions.
Representative Natsios believes the Attorney General made the finding
under pressure from public employee unions whose members feared they
would lose their jobs.1 7
The Attorney General's finding brought an end to the CLT-Republican
coalition. In October CLT announced it had abandoned the signature
drive. In its place they would submit a tax cut package for consideration
in the 1979 legislative session. This time CLT decided it "go it alone"
with its own small coalition and "do what we wanted." In December CLT
filed bills for yet another version of Proposition 2+ that was more
stringent than earlier proposals. The new bill did not exempt debt
service from the tax rate limits, it froze tax rates for cities and
towns whose taxes were less than 2.5 percent of full and value, and it
required two-thirds voter approval for new tax increases. Representatives
Natsios and Switzler filed a bill identical to the disqualified initiative.
There was yet another movement to enact property tax limits in
1978. Two South Shore realtors, Jack Conway and Margaret Carlson,
formed the Committee for Guaranteed Property Tax Relief. They circulated
petitions to place a nonbinding advisory question on the November ballot.
The petitions directed the Senator from each district to vote in favor
of legislation to reduce property taxes, increase state aid, and limit
future state and local tax increases. The question did not specify
what form the legislation would take, it only asked voters if they were
46
in favor. More than three out of four voters indicated that they favored
such legislation. Although nonbinding, the vote was a clear sign that
voters wanted property tax relief . . . and it was up to the legislature
to provide it.1 9
1978 set the stage for property tax limitation in Massachusetts.
Although there were no real successes, there were many attempts to limit
property taxes. And four important signs of what was to come were
evident by the end of the year. First, the legislature displayed its
dislike for this issue. Faced with considerable public pressure to limit
property taxes, they instead approved a constitutional amendment that
might limit state tax increases. They avoided the property tax
question. Second, the uneasy alliance of two conservative groups -- CLT
and the four Republican representatives -- demonstrated that property tax
limitation was a divisive issue. There is no one correct way to limit
or reduce property taxes; each group is likely to have its ownrI solution.
Third, Massachusetts residents wanted something done about their high
property taxes. They indicated this desire in polls and at the polls.
Fourth, by the close of 1978, there was no strong, organized opposition
to property tax limitation. The next likely step was the formulation
of alternatives to CLT's conservative Proposition 2'. And alternatives
from liberals, legislators, and the business community were proposed
throughout the following year.
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CHAPTER FIVE
When the General Court convened in January 1979, several bills were
pending to limit or reduce state or local taxes and spending. Four
bills were considered to be of major importance: CLT's Proposition 2-2,
the Republican's Proposition 2 -, the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation's
bill to limit state and local taxes to their current share of personal
income, and newly-elected Governor Edward J. King's local tax cap. By
the end of the session only one bill had been enacted, the Governor's
tax cap. It required cities and- towns, for the next two fiscal years,
to limit property tax increases to 4 percent of the previous. year's
levy. The cap excluded school budgets and permitted local override. As
a tax limit it was a stopgap measure at best.I
Despite the legislature's lack of interest in limiting property taxes,
the issue remained alive. Unlike the previous year, in 1979 several
groups proposed property tax limits. In August, 9 initiatives to limit
taxes were filed with the Attorney General. In addition to CLT,
initiatives were proposed by the Associated Industries of M1assachusetts
(AIM) and the Massachusetts High Technology Council (MHTC), the
Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation (MTF), a bipartisan group of state
legislators, a coalition of public employee unions and neighborhood
organizations, the Massachusetts Teachers Association, and the Republican
leadership in the legislature. In the end only one of these alternatives
was enacted -- Proposition 2 . A review of the history of the other
alternatives adds to an understanding of why Massachusetts voters
approved the most conservative tax limit law in the nation. 2
50
By the summer of 1979, it was clear to each of the groups listed
above that it wanted a property tax rate limit in Massachusetts. If
they could work together on an initiative they would have the greatest
chance of success. Early in the summer,several Republican and Democratic
state legislators met with representatives of CLT, AIM, MHTC, and MTF to
write and file an initiative. The coalition did not last long. Warren
Brookes condemned their meeting in his Boston Herald-American column on
the morning it was to occur. CLT quickly withdrew to pursue its own
program, Proposition 21. The others could not agree about the design of
a tax limit. The business community split between the "old money" -- the
Boston banks, insurance companies, and downtown retailers represented by
MTF -- and the "new money" -- the high technology companies represented
by MHTC. Both sides wanted reduced property taxes. But the downtown
businessmen were particularly concerned that Boston remain solvent and
creditworthy, while the high tech companies wanted to ensure that
suburban locations were attractive to employees and employers. The
traditional Massachusetts manufacturers, represented by AIM, found
themselves in the middle. The business community split on the issue.
MF joined the legislators and formed the "Committee for the Responsible
Limit." AIM and. MHTC joined forces and wrote their own initiatives. 3
The Citizens for Limited Taxation continued their program from
the year before -- working to enact Proposition 2}12. When the legislature
defeated the bills they had filed in December 1978, they once again
turned to the initiative process. For a short time, though, it appeared
that CLT's proposals might be too extreme to be successful. In May,
executive director Donald Feder held a press conference and gave his views
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on government spending. He advocated the elimination of most public
services, including schools, libraries, and fire departments. In his
view, the only services governments should provide were an army, police,
and courts. "The fat is not just the overpaid public officials," he
said," but in government doing things that don't have to be done."
Opponents hoped that these remarks would label Feder and CLT as extremist,
and discredit them with moderates who had heretofore supported them.
Charges of extremism did not daunt CLT. On August 1, they filed
two initiatives with the Attorney General. One was Proposition 21), in
the form described in Chapter One. The other was a constitutional
amendment similar to-the proposed statute. It had.the same property tax
rate and levy limits as Proposition 2 -, as well as the same restrictions
on state mandates. But it did not repeal binding arbitration and school
committee fiscal autonomy, nor did it provide a renters credit. CLT
preferred a limit in the form of constitutional amendments, but it
had several limitations. It could not appear on the ballot until at
least 1982, and only if it was approved by one-fourthof the members of
two successive legislatures. The legislature could modify it before
granting approval. And the more complex implementation measures included
in Proposition 2-f' were inappropriate for a constitutional amendment.
Proposition 22 was intended as a temporary limit to be in place until the
constitutional amendment would be effective. CLT hoped to have a complete
state and local tax "package" on the 1980 ballot if the legislature
approved the King Amendment for the second time.5
Before CLT began to collect signatures it combined forces with
AIM and MHTC whichhad jointly filed two initiatives to limit state and
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local taxes. The two business Croups were concerned that high taxes
were hurting the state's ability to attract business and employees. One
petition would have held the ratio of state and local taxes to personal
income in Massachusetts to the national average. It also placed a per
parc-el. property tax limit of 2.5 percent of full value. The other
initiative was identical, but put in the form on a constitutional amend-
ment. These proposals were simpler versions of CLT's package of the
King Amendment and Proposition 2-. CLT wasnot concerned that the
business groups would only want to reduce the tax burden on commercial
property. They felt that they represented business taxpayers as well
as residential taxpayers. Each group also had something the other
wanted. CLT, which could not count on its small membership for much finan-
cial support, needed the additional resources which the business groups
could provide. In addition, AIM and MHTC gave the CIT effort added
credibility and status. CLT in turn, provided the :ell-heeled -usinessmen
with the one resource they lacked -- a small army of volunteers willing
to collect enough signatures to put the initiatives on the ballot. 6
From September to December 1979, CLT circulated two petitions: the
AIM-MHTC constitutional amendment and their own law, Proposition 21. Once
again, CLT held a fund raising luncheon to kick off the signature drive.
In mid October, William Simon, former Secretary of the Treasury, spoke in
favor of the CLT and AIM-MHTC proposals. Stressing the importance of
the initiatives, Simon said "The tax limitation movement may be our
only means of saving our political freedom, including economic freedom."
The signature drive went well. CLT collected more than 60,000 signatures
for Proposition 21 and more than 59,000 for the constitutional amendment.
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This was just 1,000 to 2,000 more than required, but would. ensure that
the initiatives were put on the ballot. Having succeeded in qualifying
their initiatives for the ballot, CLT, AIM, and MHTC now had to make
plans for the 1980 legislative session -- both measures had to be
considered by the legislature -- and the general election in November.7
The only group that succeeded in qualifying an alternative property
tax limit law for the November 1980 ballot was the Massachusetts Teachers
Association. Their proposed statute limits property tax levies, in the
years 1981 to 1984, to the previous year's levy plus an increase propor-
tional to the growth in the stat'e's personal income. There were several
exclusions from the limit, including special education costs. The limit
applied only to cities and towns whose tax rate exceeded 3.5 percent of
equalized assessed value. It contained a similar limit for state taxes.
It also required the state, if the legislature appropriated the money, to
increase school aid so that by 1984 it paid one-half of all school costs.
MTA decided to write the initiative, dubbed Proposition 50-50 by some,
in the spring of 1979 as part of its campaign against Proposition 2-. It
staged a successful petition drive, collecting 130,000 signatures, more
than twice the number required. However by the end of 1979, many people
working for or against Proposition 2-- wondered why the teachers wrote the
initiative at all. It 1as not a "real" alternative to Proposition 2 -.
It was temporary, would not reduce property taxes, and required legislative
appropriations to be implemented. The thinly-disguised attempt to
save education -- or teachers' jobs in the eyes of many -- angered many
of MTA's natural allies who were also working to develop an alternative
to Proposition 2.
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The Massachusetts Teachers Association was not the only public
employee organization that attempted to put together an alternative to
Proposition 21.. By mid 1979, several public employee unions realized
that voters were likely to approve the initiative if there were no accept-
able alternative on the ballot. M'TA had already written its initiative,
but as noted above, most people did not consider it a real alternative to
Proposition 21. At first the public employee unions. associated with the
AFL-CIO worked together to draw up an alternative. These unions included
the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME),
the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), the International Federation
of Firefighters (IFF), and the Service Employees International Union
(SEIU). Soon they realized that they needed a broader coalition to over-
come criticism that they were only trying to save their own jobs. They
began to contact and bring in church, civic, and neighborhood groups that
feared the service cuts associated with Proposition 2 .9
At the same time, Massachusetts Fair Share, a collection of working
class neighborhood groups founded in 1973, was determined to present a
liberal alternative to Proposition 2{ on the November 1980 'allot. Fair
Share had worked successfully with the AFL-CIO affiliates in 1978 to get
the "classification amendment" adopted. The measure allowed cities and
towns to tax commercial property at a higher rate than residential prop-
erty. It was designed to prevent the shift of the property tax burden
onto homeowners that was expected to occur when court-ordered reassessments
at 100 percent valuation were coapleted. The amendment was approved by
two out of every three voters. Its success suggested to Fair Share and
the AFL-CIO that it was possible to organize a liberal coalition for
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property tax reform.'0
The coalition proved tenuous, however, when the issue at hand was
reducing property taxes rather than shifting property taxes. The problem
facing the coalition was that the public employees depended on the property
tax for their livelihood. Fair Share members, on the other hand, were
often hard-pressed to pay their tax bills; although they depended on city
services, they needed property tax relief. All the coalition members
knew they needed an alternative to Proposition 21., they just could not
agree on what they wanted. There w;ere fights not only over the substance
of the initiative, but over responsibility, ideology, ego, and finances."
In August, Fair Share filed 12 initiatives to limit or reduce state
and local taxes with the Attorney General. Fair Share filed them
to meet the August I deadline; they had not yet selected a compromise
proposal. The initiatives represented a range of proposals that Fair Share
filed on behalf of the unions. At the time they were filed many union
members had not even seen them. A Fair Share representative, Barry
Margolin, likened them to "internal working papers." Eventually the
coalition agreed to a modified version of a Fair Share bill defeated by
the legislature earlier in the year. Known as the "Taxbraker," it
proposed cutting property tax by 20 percent. The lost revenue was to be
replaced with new excise taxes on law, accounting, real estate, insurance,
stocks, data processing, and other professional services that currently
paid no taxes. Fair Share rewrote the bill as an initiative and called
it the "Tax Justice Act." They added a limit on state taxes, required
the pass-through of property tax relief to tenants, and prohibited unfunded
state mandates. Fair Share hoped the measure, clearly designed to tax
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the "rich and powerful" in order to lower property taxes, would attract
the same working-class constituency their classification amendment had.
They did not heed arguments that the proposal would face stiff opposition
from the powerful professional groups it proposed to tax.12
Despite misgivings and disagreements, the Fair Share - AFL-CIO
coalition decided to circulate the "Tax Justice Act" initiative. AFSCME,
the largest public employee union in the state, agreed to collect 20,000
to 30,000 signatures from its membership. ?ut AFSCME decided. the proposal
did not make sense politically and collected only 1500 signatures. Fair
Share and SEIU had been able to collect about 50,000 signatures. The
total was more than 5,000 signatures short of the number required to put
the initiative on the ballot. The desertion of AFSCME from the coalition's
most important project -- putting an alternative to Proposition 2- on
the November 1980 'allot -- was harmful. The "rag-tag" coalition that
was left spent much of its time bickering about how to campaign against
Proposition 21. But due to the difficulty of agreeing on tax cuts, they
lack the most effective weapon: an alternative.13
The only group still able to propose an alternative to Proposition
2- was the legislature. The Democratic leadership was unwilling to
address the issue. Hovever, a maverick, lipartisan group of legislators
and the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation organized as the Committee for
the Responsible Limit (CRL). They hoped to successfully argue for a
compromise tax limit that would diffuse support for Proposition 2. They
decided against an initiative. MF had already abandoned their plans to
circulate the two initiatives it had filed in August. The representatives
hoped they could introduce their proposal into the 1980 legislative session
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and have it adopted as an alternative to Proposition 2. Ironically,
the Republican co-chairman of the committee was Representative Andrew
S. Natsios, one of the original sponsors of Proposition 2- . Two of
the other original sponsors, Royall Switzler and Robert -uell also joined
the CRL. 4
The CRL felt that the initiatives filed by MTA, CLT, AIM, and MHTC
would "force legislative action in response to citizens' calls for tax
relief." None of the initiatives, in their viewT, offered "realistic
solutions to the problems of burdensome taxes and unbridled government
spending." CRL felt its proposed legislation would provide a responsible
limit on taxes and spending, in contrast to the "rigid' "severe," "unwork-
able," and "incomplete" initiatives, They hoped the legislature would
adopt their proposals in order to prevent voters from approving Proocsition
21 the following November. It was designed as a legislative su'stitute
to be placed on the ballot as an alternative to CLT's initiative.15
CRL proposed a two-part limit consisting of both an act and a
constitutional amendment. They proposed a limit on both state and local
taxes. Tax levies would be limited to the previous year's levy plus
one-half the percentage increase in the state's personal income. Pensions
and debt service would be exemipt from the limit. The state would be
prohibited from mandating any new local programs without paying their
full cost. Local governments could override the limit with voter or
legislative approval depending on their tax rate. School committees
would lose some of their fiscal autonomy. The approval of county budgets
would be transferred from the state to mayors and selectmen. "Management
rights" would be strengthened under collective bargaining. The META
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budget would be subject to the same growth limits as the state, cities,
and to'rns. The proposed law contained all the provisions; the
constitutional amendment only the taxing and spending limits. CRL filed
their legislation in December 1979. By that time, it was the only "real"
alternative to Proposition 2-,.16
At the end of 1978, several groups hoped to develop a less conser-
vative property tax limit law. They knew such an alternative was
crucial to defeat CLT's initiative. But the logistics of developing
an alternative proved to be more overwhelming than originally thought.
The teachers quickly drafted a proposal to protect the schools that
proved too weak to attract support. The business community split down
the middle. AIM and MHTC joined forces with CLT, while MF decided to
work with the legislature. The liberal coalition that had supported the
classification amendment fell apart. By the end of 1979, it was clear
that it was up to the legislature to devise an alternative to Proposition
21. It was too late for another initiative; only the legislature could
put their own substitute on the ballot. In 1980, the issue of property
tax limits would be in the hands of the legislature. ,They had to vote
on Proposition 21, the teacher's initiative, the King Amendment, the
CRL proposal, and any other alternative they could devise on their own.
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CHAPTER SIX
When the legislators convened in January 1980, it was clear they were
going to have to address the tax limitation issue. The issue was incor-
porated in four initiatives that had to be considered by the legislators
before they adjourned. The initiatives filed by CLT and the MTA had to
be approved by the House and the Senate in order to become law. If they
were not passed, each group could force its initiative on the November
ballot by collecting 10,000 additional signatures. The legislators also
had to cast their first vote on the AIM-4HTC initiative to amend the
constitution. The King Amendment, CLT's state spending limit filed in
1977, had to be voted on a second time before the end of the session. In
addition, several bills had been filed by senators and representatives to
limit state or local taxes. The two-bill proposal of the Committee for
the Responsile Limit was among this group. These bills did not have to
be acted upon by the legislature, but the Committee on Taxation w7as
required to hold hearings and to make recommendations on them. Given the
number and variety of taxing and spending limit proposals before the
legislature, it had ample opportunity to develop an alternative to
Proposition 22 .
The legislature's action on the initiatives filed by CLT and MTA was
swift and decisive. In early February, the Committee on Taxation held the
required public hearings. As was the Committee's custom, the hearings
were combined with those of 40 or so other related bills. recause the
Secretary of the Commonwealth had not transmitted the initiatives to the
legislature until a few days before the hearing was scheduled, they were
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not included in the bills listed for consideration at the hearing.
Consequently, there was little testimony given on them. Most speakers
that day discussed the proposals of the Committee for the Responsible
Limit, and proposed changes in the tax treatment of school energy facilities.
Despite the paucity of public testimony on either bill, the Committee
on Taxation never had much troub'le reaching agreement on its recommenda-
tions. According to Michael Capuano, an aide of co-Chairman Gerald D.
Cohen, a majority of the members was already opposed to the
idea of a rigid tax limit. On May 5, the Committee recommended that
Proposition 2# "ought not to pass." Its written report to the House was
critical of the CLT initiative. The Committee was concerned that
Proposition 2- would place "severe financial restrictions" on most cities
and towns, and force "drastic cuts" in services. The report did not
present any figures to substantiate its findings. The property tax cuts
would pose a particular problem for the state, because the Commonwealth
would be expected to make up for local revenue losses with increased
aid. However, in the Committee's view, the state did not have, and could
not expect to have, the resources to increase local aid. While acknowledging
that the property tax burden "remains the most important problem facing
the General Court," the Committee stated that Proposition 2-1 was too
"simplistic." The Committee also criticized several other provisions as
unclear, suggesting that many conflicted with existing laws. In closing,
it recommended that the General Court develop an alternative that would
limit future increases in state and local spending. The next day, the
House held a roll-call vote of Proposition 21 and rejected it by a vote
of 146 to 5; only 9 representatives were absent. Similarly, it rejected
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MTA's initiative, which the Committee on Taxation had also recommended
"ought not to pass," by a vote of 147 to 2.2
Although the House rejected Proposition 21, the vote, had not put
an end to the tax limit issue. Under Massachusetts initiative law, CLT
and NTA could each qualify its initiative for the ballot by collecting an
additional 10,000 signatures. Each group was successful with its
second signature drive In addition, the legislature still had the option
of developing an alternative to appear on the ballot with Proposition 212.
The Committee on Taxation suggested this action in its report, but an
alternative was a sensitive issue. According to Capuano, legislators were
hesitant to pass an alternative that would appear on the b-allot. Any
compromise that would be acceptable to the legislature would be unlikely
to offer the large, identifiable tax cuts of Proposition 2-. Many
legislators feared that a ballot alternative would anger voters and
increase their liklihood of voting in favor of Proposition 21. It was
also difficult to develop an alternative because the Democratic leadership
was as unwilling to support an alternative as it had been to
support tax reform in the past. ?ut a legislative alternative to
Proposition 2i would have made it more difficult for CLT to campaign for
their initiative. 7arbara Anderson, executive director of CLT, believes
that if the legislature had passed an alternative, Proposition 2 would
have been rejected by voters.
The actions the legislature took on other other bills to limit state
and local taxes illustrate how difficult it was for it, to deal with
the issue. The compromise proposal of the Committee for the Responsible
Limit came up for a vote in the late spring. Supporters felt it was
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well-drafted and promised orderly changes in the state-local tax structure.
But the bill did not have the support of the Democratic leadership and
was voted down by a 2-1 margin.. The Kin- Amendment was also voted down
in May. When the legislature first approved it in 1978, they changed some
of its wording; CLT challenged these changes in court. The court would
not decide the case until the legislature voted a second time and
4
CLT would not support the amended version.
The legislature had an even more difficult time with the AIM-MHTC
constitutional amendment. On May 12, the Committee on Taxation recommended
rejection of the amendment. At this time, AIM and MTC knew there were at
least 50 legislators who would vote in favor of the amendment, enough to
have it brought before the General Court again in 1981 or 1982. The
Democratic leadership also knei the votes were there. On May 14, the
constitutional convention was to begin. It was postponed to May 28, then
to June 11, June 18, June 25, and July 2. On July 5, the legislature
adjourned.; it had never taken a vote on the AIM-MHTC amendment. 5
This action angered AIM, MHTC, CLT, and many other groups and
individuals. They stated that the legislature had adjourned illegally,
as the constitution required them to vote on the initiative. The
legislators felt that they had addressed the initiative by not voting
on it, that no action was a "positive statement" of their views on the
subject. Warren T. Brookes berated the Democratic leadership in his
columns. Appeals were made to the Governor to call the legislature back.
In July, Richard Manley, head of the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation
wrote to the Governor, "The iassachusetts legislature has sustained its
perfect record on tax limitation. It refused all proposals to limit
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taxes in Massachusetts -- thumbed its nose at the citizens and the
constitution -- and went home to campaign for reelection." 6
While the legislature was struggling with the AIM-MHTC amendment,
Representative Cohen proposed yet another tax limit. The Committee on
Taxation had reviewed numerous tax limits and concluded, in Cohen's words,
"that the ultimate goal of all responsible tax limitation advocates is
parity with the states against which Massachusetts competes for business
and jobs." Under his bill, known as the Cohen Amendment, the ratio of
state and local taxes to personal income would be reduced.over time until
it was equal to the average rate' for 17 "competing" industrial states.
The bill was prepared by Representative Cohen's staff, They- were aided
by a group known as "Jobs for Massachusetts," a coalition of businessmen
and union members. 7
The goal of the Cohen Amendment -- to make Massachusetts "more compet-
tive" -- was very different from that of Proposition 2i -- to reduce
property taxes -- and it was not intended only as an alternative to the
CLT initiative. Nonetheless, if the bill passed with the endorsement of
the business community it would take away much of thesupport for Proposition
21. And. for a while it looked as if the Cohen Amendment would become lawr.
The late-filed bill was admitted. by both the House and the Senate in
early June. On June 26, the House passed the bill; the Senate concurred
on July 1. The following day, Representative Natsios moved that the
bill be reconsidered. His motion passed, and the bill was put on the next
day's calendar. But there was no next day for the legislature: they
adjournsd and the bill died. Natsios made the motion to reconsider the
bill because he felt it was i.eak and would not limit taxes. Had the
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Democratic leadership wanted the bill passed, there would have been another
legislative day.8
Despite their defeat of all tax limit laws, the "tabling" of the AIM-
MHTC amendment, and their early adjournment, the legislators were to have
once last chance to address tax limits before the November election. In
the middle of September, Governor King called the legislature back into a
constitutional convention. On September 18, the legislators voted on the
AIM-MHTC amendment. They are allo ed to amend an initiative for a
constitutional amendment if they have the approval of the sponsors.
Representative Cohen moved to have his bill, the Cohen Amendment, substi-
tuted for the AIM-MHTC proposal. Before the vote could be taken,
Representative Natsios moved that the Committee for the Responsible Limit's
proposal be substituted; his motion was defeated. Representative Cohen's
motion was approved by voice vote, and. AIM and MHTC agreed to the change.
The substitute amendment was approved by a vote of 172-9. If approved by
the next General Court, the Cohen Amendment will appear on the November
1982 ballot. 9
The substitution of the Cohen Amendment for the AIM'i-MHTC proposal
was to have important consequences for the Proposition 2-L campaign. It
was unclear to what extent AIM and MHTC voluntarily agreed to the
substitute. Warren 3rookes charged in his Boston Herald-American column
that Senate President William Bulger told AIM and MHTC the "door would ce
closed" if they did not agree to the substitution and withdraw their
support from Proposition 21. Representative Natsios agrees that the
business community "capitulated to the leadership." By this time, he
said, they needed'somethin- substantive to take back to their members,
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and were unwilling to see their inlititivce completely defeated. But if
the legislature thought the substitute would take business community
support away from Proposition-2-, they ;were wrong. AIM took a neutral
position on CLT's initiative, but MHTC announced its full support and
backed it with $250,000. This support was crucial in helping CLT win
their Proposition .2-y' campaign.10
Throughout the 1980 session, the Massachusetts legislature showed
that it was unwilling or unable to deal with tax limits. This attitude
was consistent with its poor record on tax reform. It did not want to
address property tax reform in the past, it was not about to start in
1980. There was also a sentiment among the legislators that if voters
wanted to "play legislature" and pass Proposition 21, they could live with
the consequences. Some felt that the legislature did not know what to
do a".out Proposition 2, so it did nothing. Others feared that no alter-
native could compete with the large tax cuts of Proposition 2. Because
the legislature found it so difficult to address the tax limitation issue,
it helped shape the Proposition 2- campaign. It failed, as had other
groups, to develop an alternative to Proposition 21, the key to opposing
the initiative. Its poor record on tax reform added to voter frustration
and anger. And its action on the AIM-MHTC amendment led the MHTC to
contribute heavily to the CLT campaign.
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CHAPTI SEVEN
In November 1980, Massachusetts voters were presented with two tax
limit proposals on the general election ballot. Election Day marked the
culmination of 3 yearswork for CLT and the groups that opposed Proposition
2 . Few voters were aware of the several alternatives to Proposition 212
that had been proposed and. defeated. In fact, many voters did not know
that the initiative would appear on the ballot until shortly Vbefore the
election. A Boston Clobe poll, conducted one month before the election,
showed that almost one out of five voters had not heard of Proposition 212.
Many others had heard of the initiative, but were unfamiliar with its
provisions. The same poll showed that one out of five voters had not
decided how they would vote on Proposition 2. Only one out of four said
they would vote in favor. 3ut when the initiative's provisions were
explained, the proportion in favor rose to 44 percent. As many voters
were unfamiliar with Proposition 2#, and uncertain how they would vote,
it is not surprising that the campaign was heated.
Pefore CLT could begin its campaign for Proposition 2 in earnest,
it had one last challenge to overcome. The Massachusetts Teachers
Association, in a final effort to keep the initiative off the ballot,
challenged a number of the signatures CLT had collected. It was not
necessary to have many signatures invalidated: CLT had gathered only
1417 more signatures than needed for Proposition 2, and only 330 more
for the AIM-MHTC amendment. MTA felt it was worthwhile to undertake the
expensive and arduous task of challenging the signatures. The union
hired petition examiners, handriting analysts and attorneys to examine
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the petitions. The collected signatures were matched with those recorded
with city and town clerks. MITA charged that a large numer of the signa-
tures were invalid because people had signed their nicknames rather than
their full legal names. CLT disputed the charge. It held that city and
town clerks had certified signatures as long as they recognized the
individuals. According to CLT, courts had upheld this practice in
earlier cases.
At first MTA's challenge met with some success. In early 1980,
the Ballot Law Commission ruled that the AIM-MTC amendment was invalid, but
it ruled. in favor of Proposition 2,. CLT and MTA immediately appealed
the decision each had lost to the Superior Court. On April 23, the
Superior Court held that there had been "no intent" to defraud by CLT,
and ruled that both initiatives had sufficient signatures. Once again,
the teachers union appealed the decisions. On July 14, the Appeals Court
upheld the Superior Court's decision. Proposition 27 was permitted to
appear on the ballot, and the AIM-MHTC amendment was sent to the legislature.
With the TA challenge behind them, CLT began to campaign in earnest
for Proposition 2. They had actually begun their campaign tro years
past when they initiated the first signature drive with the Repuilican
representatives.. And for more than a year before the election, CLT had
been sending speakers across the state to talk about Proposition 2 to
anyone who would listen. In addition, CLT participated in a series of
debates throughout the state with MITA and Representative Cohen. In these
debates, CLT was to argue in favor of Proposition 2, MTA in favor of
its initiative, and Cohen against both. Usually MTA chose not to talk
about its initiative but instead used the debates as a forum to attack
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Proposition 21. This tactic angered many moderators and listeners.
According to Barbara Anderson, much of the initial support for Proposition
2 was generated by the image of the small, "grass-roots taxpayers group"
being attacked by both the NI'A and Cohen.
Despite the support CLT had gathered over the two previous years, 'y
the summer of 1980 they had reached a low point. They depended on their
small membership for financial support and were almost broke. Campaign
contributions trickled in slowly and interest in the campaign was small.
CLT also had a change in ladership. Greg Hyatt, who led CLT through the
signature drive and the MTA challenge, left the organization. Barbara
Anderson, who had joined CLT as a volunteer in 1978, took over as executive
director. She was worried that the lack of public interest and financial
resources doomed Proposition 2 to failure. Seasoned campaigners reassured
her it would pick up after Labor Day.
Her advisors were correct. Opposition to Proposition 2- organized in
August. "y early fall, pro and con arguments were widely publicized. With
increased attention, campaign contributions poured into CLT. Most were
small amounts -- $25 to $75 -- from nonmembers. Tut in October, the MHTC
donated $250,000 after the legislature killed their constitutional amend-
ment. This donation allowTed CLT to buy time on television and space in
newspapers. CLT and their opponents agreed that MHTC's donation was crucial
to Proposition 21's victory.
CLT's campaign emphasized two themes: Proposition 2 was the best
way to lower taxes and control spending, and their opponents arguments
were wrong and misleading. After the election Anderson summed up their
stratcgy, "We supporters were pushing the joy of sex," she said, "and the
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opponents were trying to sell the fear of pregnancy." And CLT pushed.
its initiative hard. Using the same arguments they had since 1978, CLT
proclaimed its message: Proposition 21 was the only way taxpayers could
reduce the property tax burden, lower government spending, and bring a1 '-out
tax reform. CLT cited Census Bureau statistics that property taxes were
70 percent above the national average to prove that government in
Massachusetts "costs so much more than it should." .They stressed the
excessive burden that property taxes put on low- and fixed-income households.
CLT said that most property tax cuts ;ould accrue to homeowners as they
paid three-fourths of all property taxes. Proposition 21 would send a
message to the legislature, CLT claimed. It was necessary for voters to
pass the initiative because state and local legislators were not sensitive
to taxpayers' interests. Without Proposition 2-, legislators would continue
to write out "blank checks" to bureaucrats, pulic employees, arid special
interest advocates. The legislature's rejection earlier in the year of
numerous tax limits, and its failure to enact an alternative, highlighted
its inability to control taxes or spending. CLT also pointed out that
Proposition 2- was much more liberal than tax limits in other states, such
as the I percent limit of Proposition 13. With a property tax rate of
2.5 percent, Massachusetts would still be far ab'ove the national average
of 1.9 percent. Finally, CLT stated that Proposition 2- benefitted renters
4
too, since it gave them a new deduction from their state income tax.
It was difficult to argue that voters would not benefit from a forty
percent tax cut, so opponents argued that Proposition 2- would require
drastic service cuts. In turn, CLT assured voters that service cuttacks
would be small. CLT pointed out that other states provided "qualIty
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public services with much lower taxes. Cities and towns would still be
able to provide "essential services" under Proposition 21, CLT claimed. As
proof, they cited the fact that almost half of the cities and towns already
had tax rates lower than 2.5 percent. Further, cities and towns with tax
rates above 2.5 percent would not have to make "overnight tax cuts," but
could reduce tax collections gradually. And for those cities and towns
that did not want to live within the limits, there was an override pro-
vision. CLT also stressed that Proposition 2T1 would strengthen the ability
of city councils and town meetings to reduce costs, because it repealed
school committee fiscal autonomy and police and fire binding arbitration,
and prohibited unfunded state mandates. Local residents would also have
more control over spending because proposals to raise or lower the tax
rate reauired voter approval. Finally, CLT asserted that Proposition 2-
did not "mandate" reductions in school, police, or fire budgets. Cities
and towns could choose which services, if any, were to be cLt. The tax
limit would force cities and towns to use resources more efficiently, to
establish priorities, and to eliminate unecessary expenses.5
CLT also protested the "tactics" of their opponents. They charged that
opponents were breaking the law when they used pub-lic funds to campaign
against the initiative. CLT was angered that "Stop Proposition 2-" bumper
stickers appeared on school buses and government cars. They criticized
school administrators who spoke over public address systems urging students
to tell their parents to vote against the initiative. They decried the use
of public funds to print letters and flyers that criticized Proposition 2
in the name of public information. They were upset that groups who opposed
the initative would hold meetings in public buildings. At one point, CLT
7)4'
considered taking some cities and towns to court to prevent what they
called "illegal activities 101."6
Organized opposition to Proposition 21 was slow to develop. The
Fair Share -- public employee union coalition that circulated the "Tax
Justice Act" initiative fell apart after their unsuccessful signature
drive. The unions spent much of the next year bickering over the logistics
of a "Stop 2-1" campaign. By the summer of 1980, however, they knew that
to successfully oppose Proposition 2- they needed a broad-based, statewide
coalition. The "Ad Hoc Committee to Establish a Statewide Coalition
Against Proposition 2-1 was formed in June. It included representatives
of public employee unions, the Massachusetts Ta.xpayers Foundation, the
Massachusetts Municipal Association, Fair Share, the League of Women Voters,
the Mass Council on Churches, and several education groups. Throughout
most of the summer they argued over organization and strategy. 7
The ad hoc committee had four large problems to overcome. First,
the unions were to finance most of the campaign, giving them control over
its structure and focus. They had to "remain in the background;' however,
to prevent adverse public opinion. Many of the nonunion groups, fearful of
being used, were suspicious of the unions' motives and actions. Second,
the committee was stuck in a circular argument over strategy. From elections
in other states, it kneiw that "drastic service cuts" arguments were not
enough to defeat Proposition 2 -; voters simply did not believe them. To
be successful it needed an alternative to promote in 2 -'s stead. Put they
had no alternative, neither could they find another strong argument. Third,
members disagreed. over whether to have a single statewide coalition or
several small, local coalitions. Finally, the groups disagreed over the
importance of defeating the initiative, whether the ultimate goals was to
protect public services or the taxpayer. The same disagreement had
stymied them a year earlier.8
In August, a statewide coalition was formed as the "Vote No on
Question 2 Committee." It had lost most of the taxpayers groups but
gained more public employee unions, social service -organizations, and
advocacy groups. It hired Michael Vantresca, who headed Senator Edward
Kennedy's presidential campaign in New England, as director. Vantresca
saw three critical factors in the campaign. First, initial polls indicated
that ProDosition 21 would. pass. Although people might not fully understand
the initiative, the property tax cuts were sufficiently large to convin.ce
them to vote yes. Second, the strongest available argument against the
initiative was that it would cut local services. Vantresca believed that
voters were less happy with the state than local government. If it could
be demonstrated that local services would be cut, but the state was not,
public opinion might shift away from CLT. But the Committee had to present
its arguments without appearing pro-union. Third, the support of local
officials was essential. Voters tended to trust them more than state legis-
latcrs. If the mayors, councilmen, and selectmen waffled in their
opposition to the initiative, voters would be more likely to support it. 9
During the campaign, the Committee talked fervently ahout service cuts.
Through flyers and newspaper ads they presented a doomsday scenario, where
Proposition 2- required drastic cuts in public services, hitting school,
fire, police, and public works departments the hardest. It pointed out
that since many municipal costs -- debt service, pension, and state and
county assessments -- were fixed, "deep cuts will have to come in the
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programs which made our communities decent places." It asserted that
Proposition 2- would hurt most the groups that were defenseless -- the
elderly and children.
Opponents to Proposition 2 also argued that the initiative would
reduce local home rule. Cities and towns had been able to determine the
level, mix, and costs of services they wanted. Proposition 2- was the
"ultimate state mandate," because it told cities and towns how much
revenue each could raise. And if the state increased local aid to make
up for lost revenue, they would attach strings telling communities how
to spend their money. If the state assumed responsibility for local ser-
vices, they would be uniform across the state; people would have a smaller
choice among public services. Finally, the local voter override provisions
undermined the authority of town meetings and city councils.
In addition, opponents argued that Proposition 2- .,ould not provide
"real" tax relief or reform. Nothing in the initiative guaranteed that
waste, rather than essential services, would be eliminated. It would give
"great tax breaks for big business," while homeo-:ners would only receive
a small proportion of the tax cuts. As there was no restriction on new
taxes the revenue loss would be made up by "higher taxes from ordinary
working people." New state taxes would be particularly unfair to renters
who were unlikely to benefit from the tax cuts. The initiative let the
"pols completely off the hook," because it "orders the state to do nothing."
The cities and towns who would have to make the largest cuts in services,
such as Poston and Chelsea, could least afford to do so.
Finally, the opponents argued that many of the provisions in the
initiative were unworkable or unfair. The levy limits meant that gro,.ing
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communities would be hard pressed to provide new public services.
Municipal credit ratings would fall because debt and interest payments
were not excluded from the limits. Cities and towns with tax rates below
2.5 percent were penalized by having their tax rates frozen at their 1979
level. Binding arbitration is necessasy to prevent dangerous strikes by
police and firefighters. School committees needed fiscal autonomy to
-10ensure that schools remained free.of political interference.
In essence, the campaign centered on the tax cut and its effects.
CLT and their supporters argued that it would not hurt local services and
that homeowners would get most of the benefits. Opponents disputed these
statements. The campaign was characterized by a lack of facts. The
debate was muddied because no one was quite sure how much taxes would 7e
cut, how each city or town would he affected, and whether business or home-
owners would get the biggest break. In October, the Department of Revenue
released its estimates of Proposition 2-'s impacts. It predicted that
property taxes would be cut $1.5 million, more than 40 percent, in the
next few years. Local governments would lose $190 million more from reduced
auto excise taxes. The state would lose $47 million in income taxes from
the renters' credit. Earlier in the year, however, the Committee on
Taxation estimated a property tax loss of $793 million, an auto excise
tax loss of $176 million, and an income tax loss of $29 million. The
Department of Education, the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, and the
Executive Office of Communities and Development also released estimates;
none agreed with another. The estimates varied because each organization
relied on different assumptions about assessed values, inflation, and
the size of local budgets. Similarly, it was difficult to estimate how
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the tax cuts vould affect commercial and residential property owners; no
one knew how classification and 100 percent valuation would distribute the
tax burden. TBecause there was little factual information about Proposition
21' s impacts, voters had to rely on campaign rhetoric as well as their
own experience with taxes and governments to decide how to vote."
One source that provides insight into how voters felt about taxes,
governments, and Propisition 2-2- is opinion polls. Several were conducted
on the behalf of proponents, opponents, nevspapers, and universities to
measure support for the initiative. The most basic conclusion from the
polls is that a plurality of Massachusetts voters had favored a property
tax cut since the initiative ias first proposed in 1978. In March 1978,
the Public Affairs Research Center at Clark University questioned. voters
about taxes. Of those polled, 52 percent chose the property tax as the
"most unfair." When asked how Massachusetts taxes compared to those in
other states, 82 percent said they paid more overall in state and local
taxes than residents of other states; 74 percent said their property taxes
were higher. The Center conducted another poll on property taxes shortly
after the Proposition 13 election. At that time, 79 percent of those
polled favored a large property tax reduction. A Boston Globe poll con-
ducted at about the same time found that 73 percent of voters favored
the idea of a 2.5 percent property tax rate ceiling.12
In April 1980, researchers at the University of Massachusetts,
Boston asked voters about their positions on Proposition 21: 75 percent
said they were in favor of the initiative. In June, opponents began
polling voters to help plan their campaign. In their sample, 56 percent
were in favor, 18 percent were opposed, and 26 percent were undecided.
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By September the proportions had changed: 48 percent were in favor, 29
percent were opposed, and 23 percent were undecided. An October poll found
45 percent in favor, 38 percent opposed, and 17 percent undecided. One
week before the election, the Boston Globe again polled voters and found
47 percent in favor, 44 percent opposed, and only 6 percent undecided.
Although the margin in favor of Proposition 2- diminished over time, these
13polls shov that there was always support for the initiative.
Although a majority of voters favored lower property taxes, they
were apprehensive about service cuts. In almost all the polls cited above,
the proportion of voters in favor of the initiative dropped when they were
told that the property tax cut might reduce local services. - In June 1978,
the Public Affairs Research Center found only 49 percent favored a large
property tax reduction if it meant local services would be cut, In the
April 1980 UMass poll, the proportion favoring Proposition 2-- fell from 75
percent to 36 percent when the interviewers explained that local services
might be reduced. A Boston Globe poll conducted in early October found.
31 percent of voters favored the initiative after hearing that cities and
towns would lose forty percent of their revenues. Prior to hearing this
argument, 42 percent supported the initiative14
Ther-e is also evidence that voters were satisfied with local govern-
ments and their local officials. The September 1980 poll conducted by the
opponents asked voters a number of questions ab'out state and local govern-
ment. Only 22 percent of those polled were "really angry" about "waste in
local government," and only 9 percent felt that 1:ay a-out the services they
received from their city or town. Among those in favor of Proposition 2-
the sentiments were similar: 26 percent and 10 percent, respectively,
80
were "really angry" about local government Iaste and services. On the
other hand, 51 percent were "really angry" about waste in state government,
and 49 percent felt the same about corruption in state government. In
fact, only 8 percent of those polled agreed that "there is more waste in
my own local government than there is in the state government."15
Given their satisfaction with local government, and apprehension about
service cuts, why did voters favor Proposition 21? This apparent inconsis-
tency is partially explained by the fact that many voters did not know of,
or understand, all the provisions of the initiative. The signficant drop
in support for Proposition 21 after the possibility of service cuts was
explained supports this conclusion. Also, it took a long time for people
to become aware of the initiative. In April 1980, only 42 percent of those
polled had heard of Proposition 2-.1. In June, the proportion had increased
to 49 percent, in September to 66 percent, and in October to 78 percent.
One week before the election, 97 percent of those polled. had heard of
Proposition 2 -. As awareness of the initiative increased, support fell.16
In addition, it is uncertain how well voters understood the implica-
tions of Proposition 2-1. The April 1980 Uass -poll found that 42 percent
of voters felt that property tax cuts would not result in service cuts.
The September 1.980 poll found that 54 percent of voters believed that
property taxes could be cut as proposed by Proposition 2- without reducing
the "important services our taxes pay for." At the same time, only 29
percent agreed that cities and towns could still maintain the same level
of services such as schools, police, and fire protection after the tax
cuts. And 60 percent agreed with the paired statement that there was
"no way" the property tax cuts could 7e made without causing "serious
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cutbacks in local services." As few voters felt that local governments
were "wasteful," it is clear they were confused about the relationship
between property tax cuts and the quality and quantity of local services.1 7
A second explanation for Proposition 21's.support is that many
people planned to vote in favor, not 'ecause they agreed with it,
but to "send a message" to the legislature. The September 1980 poll found
that voters were cynical a-out government spending and tax reform. When
read the statement, "The politicans have promised property tax relief
and never come through -- voters ill have to do it themselves," 78
percent agreed. Another 68 percent agreed that the legislature will
never "vote to lower our property taxes, whether Proposition 2-- passes or
not." And 59 percent agreed that ""e should vote for 21 even if we don't
agree with all of it, 1-ecause it will send the politicans a message to
stop spending our money." In fact, 73 percent of voters would have
preferred a "more fair" tax system that collected the same amount of
revenues, to one that reduced the total amount.18
These polls show that much of the support for Proposition 2 existed
because voters felt property taxes were too high, not because they
wanted smaller government or fewer services. Most people were happy
with the quality and quantity of their local services. M.any would have
preferred a moderate alternative that restricted the growth of, or
slightly lowered, property taxes. UMass researcher Padraig O'Malley
concluded after their April poll that "If there is not an alternative,
it will pass." In the Boston Gole's Octo'er poll, 5 out of 7 voters
said they would prefer a limit on future tax increases and a gradual
19
reduction in total taxes.
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The only alternative on the -allot was the MTA's initiative, and it
would not limit or reduce taxes. Voters were thus given a choice between
Proposition 2 's 40 percent property tax cut and the status quo. This
probably led many to vote in favor of the initiative. In May, O'Malley
concluded that "the benefits of the known -- the tax cut -- will outweigh
the public's apprehensiveness about the unknown -- possible cuts in
municipal services." A week before the election, a Boston Globe poll
found that opposition to the initiative from .union members and self-
described liberals had fallen from its 5-2 margin the previous month.
Union members now split evenly on the proposal, and literals opposed it
by less than a 3-2 margin. The Globe called this trend, "tax revolt chic":
liberal voters did not like Proposition 21, but planned to vote yes to
"send a message" for tax reform to the legislature. 2 0
The Boston Globe, Boston Herald-American, and other paners also tried
to interpret the campaign. Their comments were consistent with the "send
them a message" findings of the polls. The newspapers concluded that
Proposition 2 was "born of frustration." In Octoer, the Globe reported
that supporters and opponents agreed the initiative was "a result of the
Legislature'-s failure to deal decisively with the issue of taxation." It
quoted Richard Mlanley, president of the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation,
who said that property taxes were in a state of crisis and that "people
are angry as hell about it.,,21
Given the legislature's poor record on property tax reform, some
reporters concluded that voters saw Proposition 2 as their only chance
to reduce property taxes. WJarren Brookes wrote in the Herald-American
that "If Proposition 2 does not get an overwheliAing vote at the polls
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November 4 it will be business as usual and your total tax burden will
rise even faster in the future than it has in the past." Even Ian
Menzies, a liberal Globe columnist called Proposition 2- "The first
step toward equitable taxation." Because the legislature could amend the
initiative and increase state aid, Menzies wrote that a yes-vote was
"simply a message to the legislature to display a little backbone and
finally get around to reforming the Massachusetts tax system."22
One month before the election, the Department of Revenue began
releasing new property tax rates, and tax bills were sent to property
owners. By the end of October, 112 cities and towns had had their tax
rates certified, with an average increase of 7.2 percent. Many populous
municipalities had even larger tax rate increases. Property taxes went up
by 24 percent in Cambridge, by 20 percent in Leominster, by 17 percent in
Pittsfield, and by 15 percent in Lynn; Boston's taxes -ere expected to
increase by 18 percent. The Globe called the increases, "the first sig-
nificant rise in local property taxes in three years." There were
several reasons why property taxes jumped. In 1979 most cities and towns
stayed within Governor King's 4 percent tax cap, often deferring costs
into the next year. In 1980, the combination of inflation, rising fuel
costs, increased. MBTA assessments, no new state aid, and deferred costs
made it impossible for cities and towns to stay within the tax cap; most
voted to override the limit. 2 3
The new property tax bills increased support for Proposition 2,.
Robert Kuttner noted. the similarity to the California election. There,
the Los Angeles County Assessor sent out substantially increased property
tax bills to one-third of the county's homeownors a few weeks before the
8t4
Proposition 13 election. This angered voters, many former opponents
voted for the initiative. Kuttner elieves that the October tax 'ills
in Massachusetts were a "textbook case" of bad timing. Opponents and
supporters of Proposition 21 were certain the bills would influence the
election. "We're not pleased that people are getting a tax increase,"
said Barbara Anderson,"But its all the more reason to vote themselves a
tax cut on November 4. . . They couldn't have happened in a petter year."
Sheila Cheimets, legislative director for the Massachusetts Municipal
Association, feared that voters would "turn out in droves" to vote yes
after they received their tax bills. "We have to assume that sharp
property tax increases. . .would tend, to push people to vote for 2+ out of
anger and frsutration," she said. The Vote No on Question 2 Committee bad.
narrowed the margin in favor of Proposition 21 until the tax 'Mlls were
sent out. "Three weeks before the election we were in a dead heat--40-40
says Michael Vantresca. Barbara Anderson believes that the tax bills
added to taxpayers' anger, saying that "No one could say property taxes
weren't too high."24
On election day, CLT was sure its initiative would win, it was just
a question of how large a margin it would receive. This margin was
important to CLT because the more voters favored Proposition 21, the less
likely the legislature would be to repeal it. When the polls closed,
voters had indicated their support. Only 5 percent of the 2.5 million
ballots cast were blank for Proposition 21, a low proportion. The
remaining ballots favored Proposition 21, by 1,438,768 votes to 998,839 --
a margin of 3 to 2. The strongest support came from the Eoston suburbs.
In Essex and Plymouth Counties, two out of three voters approved
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Proposition 2-, and in Norfolk County three out of five voters did.
But the vote was relatively consistent statewide. The initiative was
approved by voters in 287 of the state's 351 cities and towns. The
service cut argument put forth by the opposition did not appear to
dissuade voters. The property tax cuts and service cutbacks would be the
most severe in the state's largest cities and to-'ns. In the 20 largest
cities and towns, which represent almost two-fifths. of the population,
Proposition 21- was approved by 56 percent of the voters. In Poston,
which would lose about 75 percent of its property taxes, 57 percent of
the voters approved the initiative. Chelsea would lose the largest
proportion of property taxes in the state; two-thirds of its voters
approved Proposition 2, 25
Given the widespread support for Proposition 2-1, it is interesting
to look at the cities and to-ns where it was defeated. The most striking
feature of the election results is that most of these 67 cities and
towns are concentrated in t.o geographic regions: Cape Cod and western
Massachusetts. Proposition 2-- was rejected on nantucket, Martha's
Vineyard, and in 12 of the 15 cities and. towns on Cape Cod. Uith the
exception of Provincetown, all of these cities and towns had effective tax
rates below 2.5 percent of full value. Many residents felt they vould. be
unfairly penalized for their frugality by being forced to use 1979 tax
rates. In addition, the Cape and the Islands had increased in population
by 55,000 residents since 1970, an increase of one-half. The levy limit
in Proposition 2- would make it difficult to build the roads, sewers, and
schools need for new residents. Similarly, in Franklin County, voters
in 21 of the 26 municipalities rejected the initiative. Again, most
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of the cities and tons had low tax rates, and the county had had a 10
percent increase in population since'1970. "The cities and towns had
also waged a strong, joint campaign against Proposition 2- 26
Most of the remaining cities and towns where Proposition 2-1 was
def'eated were also in Western Massachusetts. In Hampshire County, which
lies adjacent to Franklin County, the measure iras defeated in slightly
more than half of its 20 towns. Proposition 2-1 was also defeated in four
metropolitan 7oston municipalities: Lincoln, Newton, Cambridge, and
Brookline. Lincoln is a small affluent suburb with taxes well .ithin
Proposition 2-a- limits. Cambridge, Brookline and Newton are large cities
with high property taxes. These cities had waged strong campaigns against
the initiative. After the election, each tried to exempt itself from
its restrictions saying that its residents preferred to pay the taxes for
the wide range of services they received. In general, it appeared that
residents in the 67 cities and townswhere Proposition 21, -as rejected,
voted against the initiative because they already felt they had control
over local taxing and. spending. 2 7
In many ways, the Proposition 2-:- election was anti-climactic. It
was but one day in a 3-year effort by CLT to reduce and control property
taxes. Polls had shown over time that voters were frustrated with
property taxes, yet concerned about service cuts. The election revealed
that frustration had triumped over apprehension, in large part because
there was no alternative to Proposition 2.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
"Poorly drafted or not, it's all we have in the way of property tax
relief offerings from any source. With it, we send a message to the state
and local governments. If we win, that message will be -- the taxpayers
have had. enough. If we lose, the message will be -- give use more of
the same; waste, inefficiency, less local aid, less home rule, more
control by special interests, higher taxes. And they will." With these
words, Earbara Anderson summarized in the summer of 1980 the essence of
Proposition 2-i.1 It was the only measure to reduce property taxes that
had ever appeared on the ballot in Massachusetts. In three years, no one
had been able to propose a viable alternative to Proposition 21. Voters
had to choose between it and the status quo. . . and many found present
taxes intolerale.
Alternatives are the common thread among all the groups and indivi-
duals who opposed or supported Proposition 2. Shortly before the election,
Representative Andrew Natsios-wrote his constituests to explain his
intention to vote in favor of the initiative. In his letter he emphasized
the importance of alternatives. He wrote: ". . . I am disturbed by
the lack of support for a more moderate alternative from most of the
groups now opposing the legislation. Where were all of these groups
when alternatives to 2 were being considered? The opponents of 21 say
that 2 is simplistic, and a more comprehensive proposal is necessary.
Where is the comprehensive alternative?" Barbara Anderson criticized
the legislature for its failure to provide property tax relief in her
comments responding to a legislative report on the initiative. "What
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are the existing government's plans to 'provide for an orderly reduction
etc.'? Where is a reasonable alternative to Proposition 21-? Where was
it five years ago? Does the Taxation Committee promise, faithfully,
that we will have it next year? 1ill Chairman Cohen apologize if we
don't?" Michael vantresca admitted that the lack of a real alternative
w.as the biggest o stacle in the Vote No on Question 2 Committee's
campaign. People would tell them they agreed with the arguments against
the initiative, and then ask: "Put what's the alternative?" Poll after
poll concluded that voters would prefer a moderate tax limit that
controlled spending over Proposition 21's sharp property tax cuts.2
Alternatives, or the lack thereof, are the key to understanding
Proposition 21. The central question of this thesis is why did
Massachusetts voters approve Proposition 2-? In almost all.other states
where a similar "taxpayers revolt". has occurred, initiatives to signifi-
cantly reduce property taxes have been defeated. Why was Massachusetts
different? A study of the alternatives problem helps provide some ans-
wers. It .as suggested in the introduction that Proposition 24-'s success
might be an indication of increasing conservatism among Massachusetts
voters. Perhaps tax revolt advocates like Don Feder, larb-ara Anderson,
and Howard Jarvis are correct. Maybe voters did approve Proposition 2-t
because they wanted lower taxes and smaller governments. After all,
these were the objectives of Proposition 21 and CLT. Proposition 21 was
approved by 3 out of 5 voters; it appears they agreed with these objectives.
But the evidence presented in this thesis makes it difficult to
accept the "conservative swing" argument. Polls conducted before the
election found that most voters were satisfied with the quality and
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quantity of their municipal services. Local governments were not
generally perceived as overly wasteful or corrupt. lany people were
apprehensive about the service cuts that might result from the property
tax reductions. If they agreed whole-heartedly with CLT, they would
by undisturbed by the suggestion of service cuts.
At the same time, voters were unhappy with the level of Massachusetts
property taxes. They had good reason to be upset. Massachusetts property
taxes were the second highest in the nation. And the state's fiscal
structure was lopsided, with a disproportionate share of local government
revenues collected through property taxes. A vote for Proposition 2i- did
not necessarily . mean a vote for fewer taxes and smaller government. It
could also be interpreted as a vote to change the way taxos are collected,
a vote to make the state' s fiscal structure more balanced. It as
likely that voters w.ould have preferred a milder version of the initiative.
Polls conducted over several months showred that voters preferred a limit
on future tax increases, with some gradual cutbacks, to the 40 percent
tax cut of Proposition 21. Several pollsters had concluded that voters
wanted more control over taxing and spending, not necessarily fewer
taxes or services. But that alternative -as not on the ballot, and the
initiative passed by a wide margin. Indeed, many liberals such as the
Boston Globe's Ian Mexzies say Proposition 21 should be seen "not as an
isolated proposal, but as the first step in a program to achieve equitable
tax reform." 3
rut if people had hoped to see "equitable tax reform," hy vote for
a measure designed to reduce, not reform, the property tax? Proposition
was intended to signficantly reduce property taxes without providing
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new sources of local government revenue. Although CLT advocated increased
state aid after the election, they originally asserted that Proposition
2- would give local governments all the revenue they needed to provide
"essential services." Proposition 21 would lower property taxes, but it
would not reform the state's lopsided fiscal structure. It addressed
only one tax and one level of government. Tt proponents were opposed to
the two avenues of real tax reform: a progressive income tax and a
broadened sales tax. This inconsistency suggests that voters did want
to "send a message" to the legislature when they approved the initiative.
Property taxes were unacceptably high and Proposition 21- was the first
means available to voters that guaranteed they would be lowered. There
was no alternative to Proposition 2- on the ballot or in the statutes
that offered acceptale tax reform.
In addition, voters had good reason to suspect that they might never
have another chance to lower property taxes. In the past, the legislature
had shown a great reluctance to address the tax issue. House Speaker McGee
bragged that he and his colleagues had not voted for tax reform in 18 years
and would not do so in the future. The legislature ayoided voting on
tax limits throughout the 1978, 1979, and 1980 sessions. It refused to
prepare an alternative. Most legislators were silent during the campaign,
unwilling to speak out against Proposition 21 for fear of alienating their
constituents. Ian Menzies was particularly critical of the legislature's
inactIon. "Some of us are tired," he wrote, "of listening to a succession
of governors and legislatures talking a-out tax reform, instituting
studies and doing nothing." 4
There were probably as many reasons for voting for or against
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Proposition 2 as there were voters. Some people do want less government,
others simply want their taxes reduced. Some may have been anCry with
public employee unions, others ,anted tax reform. And some preferred the
existing high taxes to an unknown future that vas likely to include
sharply diminished public services. No matter what the reason, the
evidence in this thesis shows that the success of Proposition 2- at the
polls was not a signal for less local government. If anything, it
represented anger and frustration Aith excessively high property taxes
and a recalcitrant legislature. For many voters, the certainty of a
property tax cut overrode apprehension a out possi7le service cuts.
Proposition 21, also underscores a 7eakness of the initiative process.
Initiatives and referenda were established in Vassachusetts in 1918.
The coalition of progressive reformers and organized labor groups that
fought for the process hoped that direct legislation would institute a
new era of political, social, and economic reform. In addition, the
reformers hoped initiatives and referenda would "veto much of the 'bad'
legislation passed y the General Court at the behest of the 'interests'."
Ho-ever, it is unclear whether an initiatives is a desirable way to
establish tax policies. Shortly after CLT and other groups had filed
nine initiative petitions to limit property taxes in 1979, Massachusetts
Director of Elections Marcia Molay labelled the process "risky" and
"lundesirawle." She felt that "the Legislature may be in the "rest position
to integrate the various political pressures on appropriations and to
balance competing demands on the state treasury." 5
Despite its "riskiness," CLT had breen forced to use the initiative
process for Proposition 2 ecause the legislature had consistently failed
to enact tax reform or taxing and spending controls. A very complex
issue -- the design and use of property tax limits -- was 'oiled down to
a simple yes or no vote. Voters could not choose vhether they wanted
to reduce property taxes, or merely limit their growth. They could not
indicate if they wanted limits on state taxes, or if they Tere willing
to authorize new sources of local revenue. As discussed above, the
absence of an alternative Was the reason many people voted in favor, even
if they did not agree with its provisions. The initiative process proved
intself inadequate to handle the complexity of tax limits. Therefore,
Massachusetts voters have given themselves a fiscal crisis lbecause
legislative failure forced them to resort to an inappropriate use of
initiatives.
In 1918, opponents of initiative and referendwm feared the "tyranny
of the majority." The Proposition 2. election is an example of this
problem. The benefits -- lower taxes -- of Proposition 21- would directly
accrue to property owners. Aside from public employees who would lose
their jobs, the costs of the initiative -- service cuts -- were largely
unknown and likely to be dispersed. With an initiative, like Proposition
21, the majority can inflict the costs of its choice on the rest of the
state; there is no representation of minority interests in an initiative
law. Opponents can only fight the initiative in acampaign, they cannot
incorporate their concerns into law. Tax cuts and tax reforms are more
properly accomodated through the legislative process. There, negotiation.
compromise, vetos, and stalemates allow. representation of minority
interests.6
In Massachusetts, the legislature is not inclined to negotiate,
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compromise, or often, discuss tax reform-or relief. Again, Proposition
2-1 illustrates how the initiative process failed. Massachusetts has an
indirect initiative process. All initiatives are referred to the
legislature before they appear on the ballot. If the legislature approves
the initiative, and the Governor signs, it 'ecomes la" without ever
appearing on the ballot. If the legislature rejects the initiative, it
is then put on the ballot. The legislature may also put an alternative
to 'the initiative on the ballot. This indirect process was established
to remove the problem of a tyrannical majority; all initiatives are
subject to legislative delate. However, in the case of Proposition 2,
these safeguards failed. Despite three years of notice, the legislature
failed to propose an alternative to the initiative. They had ample
opportunity to do so as several tax limits were proposed in the legis-
lature Netween 1978 and 1980. Of all the proposed initiatives and tills,
Proposition 2 was the harshest and most conservative. By November 1980,
it was the only real alternative open to voters.
Given its signficance, it is important to ask why there vere no
alternatives to Proposition 21. Earlier in this thesis, several
explanations for why the legislature did not pass an alternative were
put forward. Some legislators feared that no compromise alternative
could offer the same magnitude of direct tax cuts as Proposition 211. A
compromise that -as too ireak might anger voters and increase their
liklihood of voting in favor of the initiative. Another explanation is
that the Democratic leadership would not deal with the issue since it
was not yet a crisis. There was also resentment that voters might
usurp the legislature's authority to set tax policy. If voters wanted
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to approve a fiscal nightmare, the reasoning went, they could live
with the consequences. There was also the pro' lem of building a
constituency for tax reform. There were so many small winners and
losers that there was no strong sup port for a tax reform alternative.
Thit the legislature was not the only group that could propose
alternatives to Proposition 21. In addition to CLT, the Yassachusetts
Taxpayers Foundation, public employee unions, Mlassachusetts Fair Share,
the Massachusetts High Technology Council, and the Associated Industries
of Massachusetts had all proposed property tax limits. Why were these
alternatives unsuccessful? AIM and MHTC joined forces with CLT; their
proposals were simpler versions of CLT's, not alternatives. M.TF joined
with the Committee for the Responsible Limit. Although their 'usiness
constituency might have naturally allied with AIM and "qHTC, MTF did
not agree with the severity of Proposition 2-f-. They were concerned
that loston would become insolvent if the initiative passed. "ith the
legislative CRj, they hoped to push a moderate alternative to Proposition
2- through the legislature. Tarbara Anderson admits, in retrospect, that
if the legislature had adopted the CRL proposal, Proposition 2' -ould
most likely have 'een defeated. CRL chose the legislative process to
push their proposal because they did not have the resources for a
signature drive. However, the legislature was as unwilling to act on
their alternative as they nere on any othero
What of the Fair Share - AFL-CIO coalition, why was it unsuccessful
in putting together an alternative? "ased on appearances they should have
succeeded. They had experience. The two groups had successfully led
the campaign for the classification amendment in 1978. They had
97
resources. Union members and Fair Share organi7ations could circulate
petitions. The unions had sufficient financial resources to fund the
signature drive and a campaign. They also had a constituency to vote
for an alternative. In 1978 they ahd successfully organized ihrking
class groups and pu'lic employee unions around. the rallying cry of
property tax reform. They hoped to repeat this success in 1980.
They failed. The reasons they failed to put together an alternative
illustrate another less on Proposition 21.: "cuttack" politics differ
sharply from the politics of the past, when fiscal resources -ere
expanding, not shrinking. In 1978, the coalition had worked because
they were shifting the tax 'urden from residential property owners to
commercial property ouners, The classification amendment was beneficial
to all their memb'ers. Proposition 21, on the other hand., proposed
cutting property taxes; there was no obvious alternative that Nould
benefit everyone. Although both sides agreed on the ends, defeating
Proposition 2:, they fought over the means, Public employees depended on
the property tax for their livelihood. Fair Share members benefitted from
public services, but were also hurt by high, regresssive property taxes.
A real alternative to Proposition 21 had to lower the property tax
burden, otherwise people Nould not vote for it. Fair Share wanted such
an alternative, the unions were frightened of it. In the end, AFSCIF
deserted the coalition and it fell apart. Cutback politics proved- to be
divisive; there was no liberal alternative to Proposition 2-. The process
left some scars as well. The bitterness that remained between the unions
and Fair Share colored their york as the "Vote No on Question 2 Committee."
The lack of an alternative made it difficult to campaign against 2-.
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A last issue brought up by Proposition 2 is the nature of the
Citizens for Limited Taxation. CIT is a small taxpayers group run -y
conservative ideologues on a shoestring budget. It has three employees
and ramshackle offices outside of the the financial district in Boston.
It is not the type of group usually considered in ur' an politics as
yielding much pouer. In the past, one vould expect croups such as MITF,
Fair Share, 1TC, AIM, and the public employee unions to lobby for
property tax reform. MITF, in fact, had filled this role for years. Yet
among these groups only CLT has successfully changed the property tax
structure in Massachusetts. As a result, it now has gained in power
and stature. CLT is currently writing its own version of the state
budget to use in its lobbyinc. Does this mean that CLT is indicative
of a new source of power in urkan politics? I argue no. CLT was
succesful '-ecause everyone else failed. If the legislature was not
recalcitrant, and if cutback politics -ere not divisive, CiT would not
have been successful. It is a single-issue group that was in the right
place at the right time.
In sumnary, there are several conclusions to be drawn frcm this
thesis. First, Proposition 21, does not represent a movement for fewer
pub'lic services in Massachusetts. While this attitude may explain, in
part, the success of the intiative, it is peripheral. Property taxes
have al.ays been high. The legislature has largely ignored appeals for
reform. It is an old problem, exagerrated 1-y inflation and new-found
national conservatism. Then a solution, and Proposition 2- was by no
means a desired solution, was presented to voters they accepted it.
Second, Propjosition 2-1 illustrates several *eaknesses in the Massachusetts
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initiative process. In particular, tax policies are not addressed
well through an initiative. They are too complex to treat as a simple
yes-no vote. And the legislature does not have, or will not use, the
leadership to take advantage of the indirect process and propose an
alternative. Third, Proposition 21 illustrates the divisiveness of
cuthack politics. CLT's initiative ;.as harsh, 1but it promised large
property tax cuts. It vas difficult, almost impossi'le, for other
groups to propose reasonable alternative tax cuts that did not divide
their coalitions. Fihally, Proposition 2- is an important event in the
history of the Massachusetts fiscal structure. It will change how
taxes are collected and services are provided in the state. At the
moment, though, it is too early to tell exactly what those chanres
will he.
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